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In 1986 Guatemala experienced a transition from 
authoritarian rule* Many issues affected the democratization 
process, but I argue that an essential aspect was civil- 
military relations. Thus, the principal question answered in 
this thesis is: How have civil-military relations determined
the extent and nature of transition towards democracy in 
Guatemala from 1986-1990?
Adopting Alfred Stepan’s model to examine civil-military 
relations, the prerogatives and contestation of the Guatemalan 
military were examined. Prerogatives exist when the military 
assumes the right to control an issue, while contestation 
involves open articulated conflict with civilian government. 
High military prerogatives and low contestation indicate a 
situation of unequal civilian accommodation, where civilians 
do not effectively control the military.
Civil-military relations in Guatemala from 1986-1990 
reflect a pattern of unequal civilian accommodation* This 
illustrates the lack of civilian control over the military and 
continued military dominance of the political system in 
Guatemala.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, a wave of transitions from 
authoritarian rule swept through Latin America. In light of 
the legacy of brutal military regimes, prospects for 
democratization after the installation of civilian government 
have been discussed at great length. Many authors argue that 
the characteristics of civil-military relations will determine 
the success of transition. This thesis, a case study of 
Guatemala’s recent transition from authoritarian rule, will 
utilize existing literature as a guide for examination of a 
specific case. Following Alfred Stepan, I will argue that an 
essential aspect of democratization concerns civil-military 
relations. In short, I maintain that to deepen the process of 
democratization, civilian rulers must establish effective 
control over the military.1 Thus, the principal question to 
seek to answer is: How have civil-military relations
determined the extent and nature of transition towards 
democracy in Guatemala from 1986-1990?
1Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), 128.
1
This thesis will attempt to accomplish several things. 
First, a review of relevant literature will assess the 
usefulness of different approaches in examining civil-military 
relations. Also, an examination will be made of the effect of 
United States military assistance on the transition process. 
Finally, an effort will be made to illuminate the prospects 
for civilian governance in Guatemala as affected by the 
dynamics of civil-military relations in the period following 
direct military rule.
For purposes of this thesis, a transition will be defined
as political change from an authoritarian regime to a liberal-
democratic one. Transitions could also occur through
revolutionary change; however, the transitions to be examined
here will consider only movements toward civilian democracies
through elections.
In the democratic transition model, one 
"departs" from autocratic regimes 
(illegitimate administrations, controlled 
by the military, that resort to 
repressive mechanisms to manage civilian 
society) and "arrives" at legitimate, 
civilian-controlled governments, whose 
relations with civilian societies are 
based on consent.2
Liberalization, an opening of the system and loosening of
control, can occur without democratization. For purposes of
2Gabriel Aguilera, "The Armed Forces, Democracy, and 
Transition in Central America," in The Military and Democracy: 
The Future of Civil-Militarv Relations in Latin America, eds. 
Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S.R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial 
(Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), 23.
2
this thesis, democratization will refer to the movement of a 
society towards a representative form of government responsive 
to the preferences of its citizens regardless of the source or 
content.3 More precisely, democratization implies open 
contestation for control of the government with free elections 
which decide who governs.4
Military governments in Latin America have been 
commonplace, but their duration and stability have often 
proved temporary.5 These periods of military rule profoundly 
influence the process of governance which follows a retreat to 
the barracks. The literature on the military devotes much 
attention to coups and the performance of officers as 
governors. Few works are available, however, which assess 
civil-military relations during the period after a transfer 
from military to civilian government. In examining civil- 
military relations after or during a transition, it may be 
useful to know what brings the military to government and why 
it chooses to intervene. Also, it will be useful to consider 
the nature of this military and the society in which it 
operates. After a review of the main factors leading to
3Robert Dahl, Polvarchv (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1971), 1-2.
4Stepan, 6.
sEric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 138; and Alain Rouquie, The
Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987), 345.
3
military withdrawal from politics the chapter discusses civil- 
military relations during the change to civilian government 
and after*
LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES AND PRAETORIAN SOCIETIES
Huntington proposes that the armed forces of Latin 
America may not be fully professional institutions, but 
relative to other groups in society, they are often the most 
coherent. Possessing an organizational coherence, the 
military is often the only group in society which, in times of 
economic or political crisis, is able to control the 
government apparatus.6 Much of the literature focuses on why 
the military intervenes in politics* Authors, such as Samuel 
Huntington, argue that military rationale for intervening in 
politics rests in a sense of mission to protect the nation. 
This may mean removing a civilian government through a coup, 
and replacing it with a military government to save the nation 
from what it views as the perils of civilian rule. At times 
the military sense of mission may override loyalty to existing 
authority.7
The weakness of civilian institutions leads to greater 
military involvement in social, economic and political
6Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 217.
7Nordlinger, 19-20.
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spheres. This has been termed "reactive militarism," meaning 
that the military expands its role as a result of civilian 
weakness.8
The extent to which military institutions 
and individuals become politicized is a 
function of the weakness of civilian 
political organizations and the inability 
of civilian political leaders to deal 
with the principal policy problems facing 
the country.9
Many authors have noted that the military’s coherence in 
intervening in politics is often, if not always, aided by 
encouragement from sectors of civil society.10
The above discussion does not imply a lack of internal 
conflict within the military institution. Rather, it presents 
the military as possessing a measure of organization, cohesion 
and institutionalization enabling it to act decisively at 
certain key moments in Latin American polities. This 
coherence allows the military to take a direct role in 
governance.11 Existing differences based on ethnicity, 
class, generation and branch of service are often exacerbated 
by military rule. Other conflicts, over power, the spoils of
Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political 
Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1964), 4-5, 85.
9Huntington, 221.
10Stepan, 128.
11Huntington, 217.
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office and ideology, are more directly caused by
governance.12 To understand these issues, 1 will first 
examine the causes of military intervention and the type of 
society which is prone to intervention.
Latin American societies have often been defined as 
praetorian. A praetorian society is one in which all social 
forces, clergies, universities, labor unions, militaries, 
etc., are politicized. Social groups become concerned with 
general political issues, rather than with only specific 
issues relevant to the particular group. In a praetorian 
society, the rules of the political game are not agreed upon 
by the different players in the political system. Each group 
resorts to whatever methods are at its disposal to influence 
the political system, and no recognized methods for conflict 
resolution exist. In such a society, the military uses its 
superior force to intervene in politics. By the threat of 
force, the use of force, or direct control of the government, 
the military becomes the most influential political actor.13 
The following describes conflict in this type of system:
12Jan Knippers Black, Sentinels of the Empire: The United
States and Latin American Militarism (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1986), 90-91.
13Huntington, 194-197; and Nordlinger, 2-3*
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In a praetorian system social forces 
confront each other nakedly; no political 
institutions, no corps of professional 
political leaders are recognized or 
accepted as the legitimate intermediaries 
to moderate group conflict. Equally 
important, no agreement exists among the 
groups as to the legitimate and 
authoritative methods for resolving 
conflicts.14
Praetorianism is a useful concept in understanding the 
military's resort to violence as a means for achieving 
political goals.
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS 
The military in Latin America may intervene for several 
reasons. Extensive U.S. training in the post World War II era 
led to a National Security Doctrine. The enemy of these 
militaries, as defined by the U.S., was internal rather than 
external.15 Latin American militaries sought to prevent the 
rise of other social groups or popular movements from gaining 
power.16 In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to 
strengthen the Right, and the military gained a strong 
corporate consciousness. Having developed a repressive 
capability and a sense of competence, the military often felt
14Huntington, 196.
15Black, 40-43.
16Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and London; 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15-17: and Huntington 
231-233.
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that it was more capable than civilians to run the country. 
During this process, the U.S. often encouraged the political 
aspirations of the military as well, through training, aid and 
promoting increased self confidence of the armed forces.17
Military intervention is related to the sense of mission
discussed above, but also to the levels of political
participation in a society. The military can play a different
role during various stages of political development.
According to Huntington,
As society changes, so does the role of 
the military. In the world of oligarchy, 
the soldier is a radical; in the middle- 
class world he is a participant and 
arbiter; as the mass society looms on the 
horizon he becomes the conservative 
guardian of the existing order.18
In a radical praetorian system, the city (urban areas) becomes
the center of political influence in place of rural areas,
reflecting the gap between the city and the country. The
instability caused by this shift (from rural to urban) leads
the military to intervene to bring the middle sectors into the
political game. This entrance of middle class groups into
politics marks the beginning of radical praetorianism. In a
radical praetorian society, social groups use the means at
their disposal to try to influence existing authority rather
than to exercise authority. Once the middle classes become
17Black, 40-42.
18Ibid. , 221.
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the established force in politics, the military plays a 
stabilizing role. Whether or not effective institutions are 
formed to deal with mass participation determines the role of 
the military in a mass society.19
If institutions are created to deal with mass
participation, the military may become apolitical and
professional. But, if this is not the case, the military will
protect the middle class order from the lower classes. Thus
the military becomes a guardian, and prevents the broadening
of political participation.20
If the army judges that the republic is 
in danger, that disorder is in prospect, 
it has the obligation to intervene and to 
restore the constitution. Once this is 
done, it then has the obligation to 
withdraw and to return power to the 
normal (conservative, middle-class) 
civilian leaders.21
In this sense, the military exercises a veto over the
system.22
Huntington's stages of praetor ianism provide a historical 
perspective as to the development of praetorian systems. Eric 
A. Nordlinger explains different types of military 
intervention in politics in relation to the goals of the
19Ibid. , 209-212, 222.
20Ibid. , 222, 224.
21Ibid. , 227.
22Ibid. , 228.
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military, which may provide greater insight into patterns of 
civil-military relations. TABLE 1 summarizes the roles and 
objectives of the military.
Table 1
The Levels of Military Intervention
Moderators Guardians Rulers
Extent of Power Veto power Governmental Regime
control dominance
Political and economic Preserve Preserve Effect political
objectives status quo status quo change and
and/or correct sometimes
malpractices and socioeconomic
deficiencies change
Source: Eric A. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood
Cliffs, NY: Prentice Hall, 1977), 22.
Each role brings different levels of military participation. 
If the military plays the role of moderator, civilians govern, 
but do not exercise effective control. Direct control of the 
government is not needed to achieve the goals of the military 
as moderator. Often, moderators will become guardians or 
rulers. Guardians pursue much the same objectives as 
moderators, but see direct control of the government for a 
short period as the only means. Rulers have more ambitious 
goals, and set out to control the government and dominate the 
regime. Military rulers may only mention a return to civilian
10
government at an unspecified date.23
While the likelihood of moving from a moderator to a 
guardian or ruler role is discussed, moving the opposite 
direction is not. Options for a return to civilian government 
are presented, but it would seem possible to move from a more 
extreme form of intervention to a milder one. This would mean 
the continuation of a praetorian system, but the possibility 
of improvement within it. The way it was presented by 
Nordlinger suggests that this is unlikely. In my view, 
reducing the role of the military in politics seems a much 
more likely option than eliminating its role altogether. This 
approach deals mainly with military rationale for intervention 
in politics, not necessarily in a post transition setting or 
post transfer of the reins of government. As such, it does 
not provide a meaningful way to examine relevant elements of 
civil-military relations after a change to civilian 
government.
MILITARY WITHDRAWAL
Military rulers often find governance a more difficult 
task than they anticipate, and unlike civilians who can choose 
politics as a full time vocation, the military serves other 
functions, such as defending its corporate interest and 
preserving the security of the nation. Once in control of the
23Nordlinger, 21-2 6.
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government, militaries often find that governance does not go 
as smoothly as planned. As rulers, militaries usually prove 
no more competent than civilians, and so believing that their 
policies are unlikely to be reversed after a transition, 
withdrawal is used to preserve the public image of the 
military. Often the armed forces will take over government 
without explicit goals, which can cause conflict within the 
institution itself, over policies or the duration of military 
rule and proper time for disengagement.24
Military institutions may withdraw from direct governance 
for many reasons —  to preserve military unity threatened by 
rivalries created by the duties of ruling, the general 
political-economic climate involving human rights, foreign aid 
conditionality, loan reviews, concerns of transnational 
corporations, the debt crisis, some factions profiting more 
from the spoils of office, ideology, regional conflict, and 
conflict among branches of service.25 Mismanaging the 
economy and increasing corruption, the military often proves 
no more competent in dealing with economic crisis than 
civilians. Many of these' issues are seen by some in the 
military to impair efforts to defeat guerrilla movements
24Nordlinger, 142-146.
25George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl, "Liberalization and 
Redemocratization in Latin America: The Search for Models and
Meanings," in Liberalization and Redemocratization in Latin 
America. eds. George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1987), 8; and Black, 90-91.
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within their societies. Some factions are concerned only with 
the guerrillas, and others with how the crisis in the economy 
and extensive repression makes the war situation worse. Often 
these military governments face a decline in international 
support as well.26
When considering a change from military to civilian 
government, the key issue of dissension in the armed forces 
between the "hard-liners" and the "soft-liners" rests in the 
issue of return to civilian government. Hard-liners are more 
radical and essentially authoritarian in their politics. They 
would like to structurally reform the political system and 
permanently prevent the civilian groups they replaced from 
returning to power. Soft-liners are moderate, with more 
limited goals in taking control of the government. They may 
only want to remove a few political leaders and make minor 
administrative changes. The hard-liners maintain that they 
can and should perpetuate their rule, often believing that 
popular movements and democracy are disorders in society which 
they must remove or prevent. The soft-liners may agree
generally with this point of view, but also see the eventual 
need for legitimation through some type of electoral 
process.27
It is important to note that when the military is not
26Aguilera, 27.
270'Donnell and Schmitter, 15-17; and Huntington, 231-232.
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forcibly removed from power, it will play a crucial role in 
shaping the new government. The military may see a transition 
as an effective and efficient option for their own goals at 
the time.28 Nordlinger observed that there are several paths 
to civilian rule, only one of which appears possible. The 
first would be that the military is forced from office by 
extensive civilian opposition, but civilian groups are 
unlikely to be strong enough to do this. The second would be 
that officers outside the government overthrow the military 
rulers, and then turn the government over to civilians. It 
seems unlikely, though, that such a countercoup would 
relinquish power to civilians. Lastly, the military may 
voluntarily disengage from government. According to 
Nordlinger, this is the most feasible path, although this does 
not necessarily lead to civilian rule. Instead, the military 
may play the role of moderator and control the state without 
directly holding office.29 Basically this assessment of 
paths to disengagement seems appropriate, but not helpful in 
determining configurations of civil-military relations after 
military withdrawal and subsequent effects on governance.
In a mass praetorian system, where the military is the 
guardian of existing middle class order, veto coups are used
28Douglas A. Chalmers and Craig H. Robinson, "Why Power 
Contenders Choose Liberalization,” International Studies 
Quarterly 26 no. 1 (March 1982), 5-7.
29Nordlinger, 139-141.
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by the armed forces to ensure that the government does not 
pursue policies that the military disapproves of. If the 
military intervenes in this way, it has several options. The 
armed forces can retain control of the government and restrict 
participation, which may lead to more repression, or retain 
control and allow an expansion of participation. The other 
two options would be if the military returned government to 
civilians, and either restricted participation of new groups, 
or expanded participation of new groups. A return to civilian 
government with an expansion of participation would be ideal 
in the sense of a transition; however, this is complicated by 
the lack of community and institutions in civil society. This 
traps the society in a state of praetorianism, which leads to 
repeated military intervention. At this juncture, Nordlinger 
sees the military as institution builder as possibly the only 
chance for escaping the cycle of praetorianism.30
The military may leave office without leaving power. The 
best protection against democracy may be the procedures of 
democracy. By allowing elections and some participation, the 
military may diffuse demands for greater change and 
liberalization. Attempts by the armed forces to legalize the 
system lead to continued military power. An honorable way out 
for the military is to hold elections to get democratic 
endorsement of a government. The problem with such an
30Ibid. , 233-240.
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election lies in the methods used by the military to ensure 
that certain candidates will be or not be elected. Through a 
"controlled and coercive multiparty system" or a "dominant 
military party" the armed forces will continue to control the 
government. ". . .legalization often does not have full and 
complete democracy as its goal."31
If the military agrees to withdraw from government, 
certain conditions may be set. When retreating from direct 
rule, the military will often try to limit civilian authority 
over its internal operations, as well as provide immunity for 
past crimes and establish certain "power provinces" for 
continued military dominance.32 The armed forces may require 
a veto power over candidates for office, or force civilians to 
nominate preferred military officers or candidates to high 
appointed offices, especially those responsible for the 
military. Although Rouquie does not seem to adequately 
describe how civilians might gain control over the military, 
he allows for the possibility that military intervention in 
politics can become a thing of the past. "The longer military 
intervention does not take place, the more civilian power is 
reinforced, military usurpation made more difficult, and the 
political system demilitarized.1,33 Civilians may have to
31Rouquie, 351-354, 368.
32Aguilera, 32.
33Rouquie, 3 64.
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give concessions to move forward, and the military might only 
withdraw as a tactical move or to regroup.34
Many aspects of the international system make this wave 
of democratization unique.. With the collapse of Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, democratic government holds much 
prestige in an international context. Also, this signals the 
end of the Cold War, which means that the rationale of the 
National Security State needs to be reevaluated. Since 
subversive leftists are no longer the main concern of the 
U.S., policies have changed. The U.S. has placed increasing 
importance on democratic government in relations with Latin 
America, especially in the disbursement of military aid.
Rouquie notes that the main impetus for democratization 
or military withdrawal from politics comes from within the 
military itself,35 while others might assert that pressure 
from the United States plays a decisive role.36 The U.S. has 
attempted to promote democratic government through foreign 
assistance policies. The amount of influence gained through 
economic and military aid is by no means clear. Examination 
of specific cases may provide insight. If the policy 
objective of the U.S. is a transition from authoritarian rule,
34Ibid. , 359-364, 374-376.
35Ibid. , 370.
36Black, 110-111.
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does withholding military aid lead to the desired result? 
What is the capacity of Latin American militaries to act 
autonomously in spite of U.S. sanctions?
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE POST TRANSITION PERIOD
The focus of much of the literature on civil-military 
relations centers on coups or processes leading to 
intervention in politics, the period of direct military rule, 
the decision to disengage from government, or even potential 
configurations of civil-military relations. Less attention is 
focused on the period following a transition from military to 
civilian government and the factors which lead to a 
strengthening of civilian control or failure and continued 
military dominance. Alfred Stepan has devised a useful model 
to analyze the relationship between civilians and the military 
after a transfer from military to civilian government with 
attention to areas of potential conflict.37
The two main areas selected to examine the amount of 
civilian control are the dimension of articulated military 
contestation (against policies of the new government) and the 
dimension of military institutional prerogatives. There are 
several areas for potential conflict between the military and 
a new civilian government. These are the human rights abuses 
of the previous regime and how they will be handled,
37Stepan, 68.
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democratic government attempts to change the organizational
mission and structure of the military (control the military),
and the military budget,38
Military prerogatives are a bit complex.
For our purposes, the dimension of 
military institutional prerogatives 
refers to those areas where, whether 
challenged or not, the military as an 
institution assumes they have an acquired 
right or privilege, formal or informal, 
to exercise effective control over its 
internal governance, to play a role 
within extramilitary areas within the 
state apparatus, or even to structure 
relationships between the state and 
political or civil society.39
Low levels of prerogatives exist when a civilian government
holds de jure and de facto control over an issue area. If the
military is denied de jure control, but engages in
noncompliance, then the military prerogative would be
considered moderate. An area where this may be visible is
when the military is constitutionally subject to civilian
control and authority, but de facto the military remains
autonomous. Other prerogative areas are: Military
relationship to the chief executive (Who has de jure and de
facto control?) , and the role of the military in Cabinet
positions, intelligence, military promotions, and the legal
system (Are military officers generally subject to civil laws
38Ibid.
39Ibid. , 93.
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and courts or military justice?).40
These prerogatives are closely related to military 
contestation. Potentially every prerogative area could be 
contested by the military. Contestation involves open 
articulated conflict with civilian authorities. This would 
indicate that the relevant civilian and military actors are 
aware of the conflict over policies. Lack of contestation 
does not necessarily imply a lack of prerogative in a 
particular area. By comparing the levels of both, several 
relationships are possible. When both are low, civilian 
control results. If the two dimensions are plotted against 
each other, this would be the area in the lower left corner 
(see TABLE 2) . Intense conflict between the military and 
civilians where contestation and prerogatives are high would 
be a nearly impossible position for civilians to sustain 
(upper right on chart). The upper left position while 
analytically possible is unlikely in reality. It would not 
make sense in a situation of de jure and de facto civilian 
control for the military to engage in high levels of 
contestation.41
40Ibid. , 93-97.
41Ibid. , 68, 98-102.
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TABLE 2
C O N T E S T A T I O N ,  P R E R O G A T I V E S ,  A N D  C I V I L  M I L I T A R Y  R E L A T I O N S
330 U n s u s t a i n a b l e  p o s i t i o n  tor  
m i l i t a r y
l e a d e r s
N e a r  u n t e n a b l e !  
p o s i t i o n  for : 
d e m o c r a t i c  ; 
l e a d e r s  ;
5  c i v i l i a n
2  c o n t r o l
L O W  M I L I T A R Y  P R E R O G A T I V E S  H I G H
Source: Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil
and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1988), 100.
The relationship of unequal civilian accommodation (lower 
right) is perhaps the most interesting, considering the 
possibility for change. This model is dynamic and subject to 
shifts of any magnitude; therefore, a position of unequal 
civilian accommodation could be consolidated into a
U n e q u a l  c i v i l i a n ;  
a c c o m o d a t i o n  <
21
democratic system. This relationship may be extremely useful
in analyzing Guatemala and prospects for democracy since the
transition in 1986* Some aspects of this position appear
relevant to Guatemala:
Another vulnerability of the 'unequal 
civilian accommodation' position is that 
a polity could become transformed into a 
nondemocratic civilian-headed garrison 
state because of exploitation by the 
executive of the prerogatives of the 
military retained in the system. An 
additional basic weakness of this 
position is that the lack of regime 
autonomy from the military implied in 
such high military prerogatives could 
delegitimize the new democracy in the 
eyes of civil and even political 
society*42
Stepan's model, unlike the other approaches, provides 
concrete areas for examination in post transition civil- 
military relations. In my opinion, civil-military relations 
is the most crucial issue in discussing democratic governance 
in Latin American states that have experienced military 
authoritarian rule in the past. Previously, this model was 
applied to South America. Guatemala provides a unique 
opportunity to broaden the range of countries analyzed to 
Central America. Military rule ran practically uninterrupted 
in Guatemala for thirty years prior to the transfer of 
government in 1986. Thus, civil-military relations are 
crucial to understanding prospects for democratic governance
42Ibid., 101.
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in the future.
Guatemala today, although nominally headed by civilian 
government, remains likely the most repressive military regime 
in the Western hemisphere. This Central American nation, 
controlled by the military, was allowed to undergo relatively 
free elections in 1985, and witnessed the installation of a 
civilian president in 1986. The last interlude of civilian 
rule experienced by Guatemala occurred during the 
revolutionary period from 1944-1954. So why would the 
entrenched, institutionalized military of the early 1980s 
allow this apparent transition and what are the prospects for 
a democratic consolidation of civilian rule? The period from 
1986-1990 represents the first completed term in office for a 
civilian president after the military turned over the official 
reins of government. Even though the term was completed and 
a peaceful transfer of power occurred in 1991, the extent of 
transition was not clear. In my view, the most significant, 
but not the only, dimension to gauge progress towards 
democratic governance is the nature of civil-military 
relations. Thus, the principal question to seek to answer is: 
How have civil-military relations determined the extent and 
nature of transition towards democracy in Guatemala from 1986- 
1990?
Using Guatemala as a case study of a recent change from 
military to civilian government it will be possible to apply
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Stepan's model of civil-military relations in a transition 
from authoritarian rule. The analysis will be based on 
information collected from primary and secondary sources as 
well as personal interviews by the author* The remainder of 
this thesis has several objectives. First, a review of the 
historical context in Guatemala will aid in a discussion of 
prerogatives and contestation in the period after military 
withdrawal. Secondly, the degree of U.S. influence through 
military aid in affecting the installation of civilian 
government will be examined. Lastly, a summary of the 
research, conclusions, and an assessment of the nature of 
civil-military relations in Guatemala will lead to a final 
expectation of this thesis which is to test the validity of 
Stepan's model. Considering that the model was developed to 
examine Brazil and the Southern Cone, this case study should 
provide a very useful gauge of the method in a comparative 
setting.
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CHAPTER TWO
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Guatemala is the largest country in Central America, 
located just south of Mexico, and is bordered by Belize, 
Honduras and El Salvador. Much of the population is of Mayan 
descent, although only about one-third is identified as Indian 
now. The other two thirds can be termed Ladino, which may 
indicate Spanish-Mayan descent, but more importantly 
identifies those who have adopted Western dress and lifestyle. 
The Maya of the rural highlands are still for the most part 
excluded from politics. The majority of the population is 
poor and marginalized. Racial and class tensions are strong, 
with Indian used as a derogatory term.1 Control of these 
Indian masses in the countryside is important in understanding 
Guatemalan politics.
Politics in Guatemala from the time of independence from 
Spain have been controlled by small groups often through 
violent means. Even when the formal trappings of democracy 
have been in place, it has been in name only. A brief history
1For a more complete discussion see Peter Calvert, 
Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil (Boulder: Westview Press,
1985).
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will be useful to set the stage for the transition and 
afterwards. The political arena in Guatemala until 1944 was 
dominated by personalistic leaders. From 1898-1920, the 
country was controlled by Manuel Estrada Cabrera, who relied 
on a few individuals rather than a military institution to 
perpetuate his rule. Later, General Jorge Ubico ruled with 
U.S. State Department backing from 1931-1944. Neither of 
these caudillos, although they employed repression, depended 
on the military as an institution to sustain their regimes. 
In spite of this, Ubico militarized the society in a 
significant way. He extended military operations in the 
countryside, making the armed forces dominant in this area. 
This transformation remains essential in explaining military 
prerogatives until the present time.2
The two successive administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo 
and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1944-1954) represent the last period 
of legitimate, elected presidential government in Guatemala 
until 1986* The "Revolution" from 1944-1954 began when Ubico 
was ousted due to popular unrest. When his successor, the 
head of a junta, indicated that he wanted to pursue a similar 
style personal dictatorship, younger officers moved against 
the ruling junta. The elected government of Arevalo (1944- 
1950) faced more than thirty coup attempts, but was not
2 Jim Handy, "Resurgent Democracy and the Guatemalan 
Military," Journal of Latin American Studies 18 no. 2 
(November 1986): 386-387.
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toppled because the bulk of the military did not support the 
coups* Captain Jacobo Arbenz, one of the leaders of the 
revolt in 1944, became President of Guatemala in 1950. Arbenz 
enjoyed some military support, and although the armed forces 
did not always approve, he pursued reforms, most importantly 
agrarian reform.3
TABLE 3
GUATEMALAN LEADERS 1931-1991
1931-1944 General Jorge Ubico
1944-1950 Juan Jose Arevalo
1950-1954 Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzm&n
1954-1957 Castillo Armas-Liberation leader
1958-1963 General Miguel Ydlgoras Fuentes
1963-1966 Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia
1966-1970 ar Mendez Montenegro
1970-1974 Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio
1974-1978 General K iigerud
1978-1982 General Romeo Lucas Garcia
1982-1983 General Efraln Rios Montt
1983-1986 General M Victores
1986-1991 Vinicio Cerezo
1991-? Jorge Serrano
DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WAR 
In 1954, the United States' Central Intelligence Agency
3Ibid., 388-390.
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aided and promoted an overthrow of Arbenz's government on the 
grounds that it was Communist. Though not a Communist, his 
mistake was to institute land reform supported by the 
Communists.4 It is argued that one of the main factors 
influencing the U.S. decision was an attempt to apply the 
agrarian reform to lands owned by the United Fruit Company. 
Consequently, the U. S. organized a Liberation army of exiles 
and mercenaries in Honduras, as well as fostering internal 
opposition.5
A significant aspect of the overthrow of the Arbenz 
government is the military's refusal to defend the country 
against the invasion of the Liberation forces. Arbenz had 
encouraged peasant organization in rural areas, and as a 
result, the military was losing influence in the countryside.6 
This prerogative, to dominate the countryside, as mentioned 
above, plays a crucial role in the part the military takes in 
politics.
The 1954 coup led to the formation of guerrilla groups,
4 Jim Handy, " 'The Most Precious Fruit of the 
Revolution1: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform, 1952-54,"
Hispanic American Historical Review 68 no. 4 (November 1988): 
700; Allan Nairn and Jean-Marie Simon, "Bureaucracy of Death," 
The New Republic (30 June 1986); 15.
5Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 390.
6Ibid., 391.
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both Communist and not.7 The Guatemalan military then used 
lists from different groups which supported Arbenz to classify 
70,000 people as Communists, employing these records to begin 
the counterinsurgency war that continues today, and 
establishing a prerogative in the area of counterinsurgency. 
Instead of focusing on eradicating Communist guerrillas, the 
military expanded operations to target anyone suspected of 
being a guerrilla, of being a potential guerrilla, or of 
supporting guerrillas.8 Basically, the counterinsurgency of 
the Guatemalan military proceeded in several stages
a purgative anti-communist 
transitional era, 1954-66; a 
constitutional era, 1966-82, which relied 
on institutionalized state terrorism; and 
an even more brutal era of direct 
extra-constitutional military rule, March 
1982-January 1986.9
The violence in Guatemala ranged from periods of
indiscriminate use of widespread murder of entire communities
7Alfonso Yurrita, "The Transition from Military to 
Civilian Rule in Guatemala," in The Military and Democracy: 
The Future of civil-Military Relations in Latin America, eds. 
Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson and Juan Rial 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 77; John A. Booth and
Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1989) , 39; and Penny Lernoux, "Guatemala's New 
Military Order," The Nation. 28 November 1988, 557.
8Gordon L. Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization by Way of 
Democratization in Guatemala," in Liberalization and 
Redemocratization in Latin America, eds. George A. Lopez and 
Michael Stohl (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), 37-38, 40;
and Nairn and Simon, 15.
9Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 40.
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to more discriminate killings.10
The guerrilla groups which formed after the coup in 1954
wanted to reclaim the unfinished revolution of the previous
decade. As the guerrillas evolved and eventually unified into
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), their
ideology was essentially Marxist, acknowledging the need for
revolutionary conflict.11 The desired establishment of a
revolutionary, popular, democratic government had several
objectives:
(1) guarantee the elimination of 
repression; (2) guarantee the provision 
of the basic needs of the majority of the 
people by eliminating the political 
domination of the repressive rich, both 
national and foreign, who rule Guatemala;
(3) guarantee equality between Indians 
and ladinos; (4) guarantee the creation 
of a "New Society" in which all 
patriotic, popular, and democratic 
sectors will be represented; and (5) 
guarantee a policy of nonalignment and 
international cooperation.12
Throughout the stages of counterinsurgency, the 
Guatemalan military has developed an institutional capacity to 
conduct counterinsurgency and established a National Security
10Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," in Latin American and 
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 7, eds. James M. Malloy and 
Eduardo Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), B265.
11Caesar D. Sereseres, "The Highlands War in Guatemala," 
in Latin American Insurgencies, ed. Georges Fauriol 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1985), 109-111.
12Ibid., 111.
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State. Destroying the guerrillas in an effort to defend and 
protect the nation became the essence of the military's 
mission.13 After the coup in 1954, the Guatemalan military 
was not well equipped to deal with a guerrilla threat. Having 
just aided in the overthrow of a "communist” government, the 
U.S. proceeded to assist the Guatemalan military in enhancing 
its counterinsurgency skills.14 In the early 1960s, the 
military pursued a type of civic action program in addition to 
the use of violence* The U.S. supplied aid and advisors to 
implement this program of "winning the hearts and minds'1 of 
the population. Much of this assistance came under the 
Alliance for Progress as the U.S. helped shape the Guatemalan 
military's counterinsurgency tactics.15
With the election of Julio Mendez Montenegro in 1966, a 
civilian President forced to allow the military a free reign 
in counterinsurgency, the tactics turned more towards violence 
and repression. From this period until 1982, with differing, 
but always high, levels of terror and murder, the military
13Ibid. , 105.
14Howard Sharckman, "The Vietnamization of Guatemala: 
U.S. Counterinsurgency Programs," in Guatemala, eds. Susanne 
Jonas and David Tobis (Berkeley: North American Congress on
Latin America, 1974), 193-194.
15Sharckman, 194; and Yurrita, 79.
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attempted to destroy the guerrillas once and for all,16
As the Guatemalan counterinsurgency 
evolved and escalated, its focus shifted 
from "winning hearts and minds" to 
controlling the behavior of the 
population through outright terror; thus, 
an essentially localized offensive 
evolved into a system of totalitarian
control.17
Some debate exists as to the extent of U.S. involvement 
in the Guatemalan counterinsurgency campaigns. That the
relationship was close seems certain; for example, the U.S. 
trained Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion in bases in 
Guatemala.18 Although the association was close, officially, 
United States* military personnel served in advisory roles 
only.19 According to retired U.S. General Frederick F.
Woerner, who served in Guatemala from 1966-1969, U.S. forces
were never used directly in combat.20 Even though U.S. 
forces may not have been directly involved, the U.S. was able 
to influence the development of counterinsurgency in Guatemala
16Eugene K. Keefe, "National Security," in Guatemala:..A
Country Study, ed. Richard F. Nyrop (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983), 186; Sharckman, 195, 202- 
203.
17Sharckman, 193.
18Keef e, 186.
19Sharckman, 198-199.
20General Frederick F. Woerner, phone interview by author, 
20 September 1991.
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through aid, training, advisement and military hardware.21
Rios Montt, a presidential candidate and General in 1974, 
assumed control of the government in 1982. His association 
with the military had been weak since 1974, while he pursued 
activities in a fundamentalist Protestant church. His ties 
with the Christian Democratic party did not prevent the fervor 
of counterinsurgency pursued during his government. This 
phase of counterinsurgency involved procedures to permanently 
alter the organization of the countryside. By forcing 
peasants into model villages, civil defense patrols and 
through the use of civic action programs involving food 
distribution and re-education, the military aimed at complete 
control.22 A degree of success was achieved, putting the 
military in a stable position, which facilitated the transfer 
from military to civilian government in 1986.
Rios Montt was overthrown in 1983 and replaced by 
officers led by General Mejia Victores. General Mejia began 
to reinforce army discipline and prepared for elections in 
1985.23 Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo, a Christian Democrat, won 
the elections in a run-off with 68.4 percent of the votes.
21Sharckman, 19 6.
22Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 402-403; Tom Barry, 
Guatemala: A Country Guide (Albuquerque: The Inter-
Hemispheric Education Resource Center, 1989), 41-42; and
Sereseres, "Highlands War," 113-115.
23Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 405.
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His party's strong showing reflected the divided nature of the 
opposition, and was tempered by promises to avoid major land 
reform and prosecution of officers for human rights abuses in 
order to placate the military.24 At the time of the 
elections, "The army was in a more powerful position in 
relation to the other political actors in Guatemala than it 
had ever been."25
Along with violence from the military institution, the 
armed forces and private right-wing groups worked through 
death squads. Much of this activity was supported directly by 
the military, but private groups such as the Secret Anti­
communist Army (ESA) , the White Hand and Jaguar of Justice 
(JJ) have also taken credit for murders. Death squad activity 
lessened at the beginning of Cerezo's term, but rose 
throughout the rest of his administration (as with human 
rights violations overall, to be discussed below),26
By 1985, the Guatemalan military considered itself to be 
in control of the country, having massacred tens of thousands 
of peasants and having destroyed much of the guerrillas' 
organization. The military held supremacy at this point as a 
result of scorched earth policies, relocation of peasants in
24Richard Millett, "Guatemala,1 in Latin American. and
Caribbean Contemporary Record, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (New 
York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), B299.
25Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 403-405, 408.
26Barry, 51-52.
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model villages (concentration camps), and the creation of 
Civil Defense Patrols.27 But, by 1988, the guerrilla 
movement seemed to have revived somewhat, despite denials from 
the army. Military deaths were up from the previous year, and 
the counter insurgency war escalated. The army will only 
accept complete surrender on the part of the guerrillas, and 
the guerrillas will not give in.28
ECONOMIC DECLINE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
In light of Guatemala's deteriorating economic situation, 
the corruption and human rights abuses did not bode well for 
the military. Military government remained unable to provide 
solutions to economic crisis or to stop the decline. Low 
prices in the early to mid-eighties for Guatemala's 
agricultural exports added to the debt problem, caused by 
public sector (military) borrowing.29 The rising debt was 
not arrested until 1988, and the amount required to service 
the debt climbed as well (see TABLE 4). Guatemala's Gross
27Robert H. Trudeau, "The Guatemalan Election of 1985: 
Prospects for Democracy,1' in Elections and Democracy in 
Central America, eds. John A Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 99;
and Lernoux, 556, 558.
28Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B269; and Barry, 37-39, 
56-57.
29Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 46-47; James 
Painter, "Guatemala in Civilian Garb," Third World Quarterly 
8 no. 3 (July 1986): 827.
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Domestic Product declined during this period also.30 By 
1986, more than half of Guatemala's export earnings were 
required to make payments on the national debt. Along with 
this Guatemala faced other economic woes, a decline in 
tourism, increasing unemployment, and a falling currency, the 
quetzal.31
TABLE 4
SELECTED ECONOMIC DATA FOR GUATEMALA
Total
GDP
(growth
rates)
Total external 
disbursed debt 
(millions of 
dollars)
Debt service 
paid 
(long-term) 
(millions of 
dollars)
1980 3.7 1165.8 137.2
1981 0.7 1264.2 128.1
1982 -3.5 1537.3 135.4
1983 -2.6 1799.4 177.5
1984 0.5 2343.0 256.9
1985 -0.6 2616.9 268.3
1986 0.1 2755.2 293.9
1987 3.5 2816.2 303.2
1988 3.7 2632.5 358.8
1989
estimate
4.0 2665.0 378.0
Progress in Latin America 1990 Report (Baltimore; 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 114.
Johns
30Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social,
Progress in Latin America 1990 Report (Baltimore; Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990), 114.
31Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization,1 46-47.
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Economic decline added to the opposition of traditional 
economic elites to the military regime. The business elite 
sector in Guatemala was more powerful than its Central 
American neighbors. The Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Industry and Finance (CACIF) represented business interests 
conflicting with military governments. The break between the 
dominant economic class and the military was indicative of the 
economic elites desire to participate directly in the 
government and lessen the autonomy of the military. This 
split led to pressures by traditional elites for 
transition*32 Military expansion into the economy as 
entrepreneurs and owners (see below THE MILITARY AS AN 
ECONOMIC PLAYER) was seen as threatening to the interests of 
traditional economic elites, because military enterprises 
competed with those of the traditional elites.
Not only could the military not produce results in 
resolving economic crisis, the political violence stemming 
from the counterinsurgency war greatly contributed to, or even 
caused many of Guatemala's economic problems*33 The 
repression and violence of the military created a "wandering
32Eduardo Gamarra and A. Douglas Kincaid, "Democratization 
in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Bolivia and
Guatemala," Paper presented to the annual meeting of the 
Southern Political Science Association (Charlotte, NC: 
November 5-7, 1987), 26-27, 29.
33Richard Millett, "Guatemala: Progress and Paralysis,"
Current History (March 1985): 111-112.
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and dislocated rural labor force," and an increasingly 
disruptive guerrilla force.34 A drop in the tourist trade 
resulted from the extreme political violence.35 Most 
significant is the interrelation of international isolation 
and economic collapse as a result of the military's human 
rights abuses and mismanagement of the economy.
THE MILITARY PRODUCES INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION 
From 1954 to 1986, military regimes in Guatemala, 
including one term with a civilian President, have searched 
for stability and security. A constant struggle with 
guerrilla insurgents, and the problems this created within the 
military itself (See section DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY), 
helped to produce coups and instability, further exacerbating 
economic problems.36 National elections and transfer of 
government to civilians in many ways are an extension of the
34Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 46.
35Millett, "Progress and Paralysis," 111.
36For further discussion of Guatemala's post-1954 military 
governments see: George Black, Garrison Guatemala (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1984); Handy, "Resurgent Democracy," 
383-408; Gordon L. Bowen, "Guatemala: The Origins and
Development of State Terrorism," in Revolut ion and
Counterrevolution in Central America and the Caribbean, eds. 
Donald Schultz and Douglas Graham (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1984), 269-300; and Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
United States Policy Toward Guatemala, prepared statement of 
Caesar D. Sereseres, 98th Cong., 1st sess., 1983, Committee 
Print, 25-59.
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search for stability. The transition was seen by some in the 
military as a long term project for future security.37 The 
isolation internationally is one element of the instability 
faced by the military prior to 1986.
The reasons for a nominal "transition” to civilian 
government had become clear.
A democratically elected administration 
was seen by the army as a necessary 
condition for new and expanded flows of 
foreign investment and bilateral and 
multilateral economic aid, which were 
regarded as the best way out of the 
economic decline and the increasing 
social polarisation, which, if it were 
not at least halted, could only benefit 
the left in the long term.38
According to Millett, to obtain significant foreign economic
aid, desperately needed in light of Guatemala's economic
decline, the military must at least let there appear to exist
elected civilian rule.39
ROLE OF U.S. MILITARY AID
The nose dive in Guatemala's economy necessitated large 
amounts of resources from outside to even begin to improve, 
but military economic policy and counterinsurgency tactics 
almost completely isolated Guatemala internationally. The
37Barry, 43-44.
38Painter, "Civilian Garb," 819.
39Richard Millett, "After the Elections," TheNewReBUblic 
(24 February 1986): 18.
39
state terrorism practiced by the military created isolation 
between Guatemala and the international community, 
significantly the U.S. Loans and international aid became 
increasingly vital, but unavailable to the military regime. 
Human rights abuses had led to the termination of U.S. police 
aid in 1975 and, finally, U.S. military aid in 1977.40 The 
impact of the cut off of U.S. military aid on the Guatemalan 
military is unclear. Military aid was not resumed until 1985 
when Guatemala received $.5 million in U.S. dollars in 
assistance, with increases to $5.4 million in 1986 and $5.5 
million in 1987 (see TABLE 5) . The resumption of aid began 
after elections were held for a constituent assembly to draft 
a new constitution and prepare for the scheduled elections in 
1985.41
In spite of this, some military aid from the U.S. appears 
to have been supplied secretly during the sanctions, and 
military goods were sent from Israel as well.42 Used as a 
surrogate, Israel supplied military hardware, advisors and 
training to benefit itself (profits from sales) as much as the
40Allan Nairn, "The Guatemalan Connection," The 
Progressive (May 1986): 20-22.
41Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B262; and James W. Wilkie 
and Enrique Ochoa, eds., Statistical Abstract of Latin America 
vol. 27 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center
Publications, University of California, 1989), 770.
42Nairn, 20-22.
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TABLE 5
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO GUATEMALA
YEARS MILITARY 
AID IN US 
$
MILLIONS
TOTAL 
ECONOMIC 
AID IN US 
$ MILLIONS
TOTAL
ECONOMIC AND 
MILITARY AID 
IN US $ 
MILLIONS
1966 1.4 9.0 10.4
1967 2.1 14.1 16.2
1968 1.0 16.5 17.5
1969 2.3 9.1 11.4
1970 1.3 32 . 2 33.5
1971 6.1 16.7 22.8
1972 1.8 16. 6 18.4
1973 3.7 11.9 15.6
1974 1.4 4,7 6.1
1975 2 . 9 14.1 17.0
1976 2.1 43.5 45.6
1977 0.5 20.8 21.3
1978 * 10. 6 10.6
1979 * 24.7 24.7
1980 - 13.0 13 . 0
1981 - 19.0 19.0
1982 - 15.5 15.5
1983 - 29 .7 29.7
1984 - 20.3 20.3
1985 0.5 106,9 r"
1986 5.4 116.7 T lTTI
1987 5.5 187.8 5
1988 9.4 132.2 141.6
1989 9.4 147.2 156.6
Source: Agency for International Development, Statistics and
Reports Division, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and 
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C., 
1975), 46; Agency for International Development, Office of 
Program and Information Analysis Services, Bureau for Program
Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, and
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C., 
1978), 50; Agency for International Development, Office of 
Planning and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy
Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and .Assistance
from International Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1980), 50; 
Agency for International Development, Office of Planning and 
Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, ILJEL. 
Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from^^jrteraationaT
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Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1982), 48; Agency for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting, 
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas
Loans and Grants and Assistance from International
Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1987), 51; and Agency for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting, 
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas
Loans___a.nd_  Grants and Assistance from International
Organizations (Washington, D.C., 1990), 51.
U.S.43 Commercial sales to the Guatemalan government and
private businesses were allowed to continue during this 
period, although they declined.44 Officially anyway, from 
the U.S. point of view, the Contras in Nicaragua seemed more 
worthy of support than the extremely violent Guatemalan 
military, pushed to the background by the anti-Sandinista 
campaign.45 The U.S. was concerned that the Soviets would 
exert influence in Central America after gaining a foothold in 
Nicaragua. Policy was often designed to limit the possibility 
of other guerrilla movements following the example of the 
Sandinistas.46
Policy goals of U.S. military assistance in Guatemala
43Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "The United States, Israel, and
Guatemala: Interests and Conflicts," in Centra1 Alter l ea and
the Middle East: The Internationalization of the Crisis, ed.
Damian J. Fernandez (Miami: Florida International University
Press, 1990), 97, 108; and Victor Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy,"
Mother Jones (July 1985): 40, 43.
44General Accounting Office, Military Sales:__The__United
States Continuing Munition Supply Relationship__With_Guatemala 
GAO/NSIAD-86-31 (January 1986), 4, 8.
45Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 45.
46Sereseres, "Highlands War," 102-103.
42
have included democracy, economic stabilization, equity and 
defeat of the leftist insurgency. Guatemala has demonstrated 
its independence from the U.S. in this regard* The 
termination of U.S. military assistance in 1977 was a mutual 
decision. Guatemala had rejected the aid because of human 
rights conditions that were seen as interfering in the 
country's internal affairs.47 This raises significant doubt 
as to the effectiveness of aid in promoting democracy. Some 
argue that military aid was needed by Cerezo to pacify hard 
liners in the military, while others would say that the 
military will never truly give power to civilians when they 
are rewarded with military aid for a facade democracy.48
MILITARY MISSION AND STRUCTURE 
The military in Guatemala holds a substantial degree of 
autonomy which has developed over time. The armed forces are 
composed of the army, navy and air force, but the army is 
dominant. Top level army decisions in general represent the 
view of the military as a whole. Recruits are generally the 
rural poor and forced to serve, while officers are from the
47 Jonathan E. Sanford, "Guatemala: U.S. Foreign
Assistance Facts," Congressional Research Service, 11 June 
1987, 3, 5.
48Caleb Rossiter and Bonnie Tenneriello, "Can U.S. 
Military Aid Really Help a Civilian President?" Christian 
Science Monitor. 9 June 1988, 13; and Sanford, "Foreign
Assistance," 9-10.
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middle class. The military has traditionally assigned itself 
not only the role of security, but that of saving the nation 
as well, so that the responsibility felt by the armed forces 
extends beyond eradicating communists into all sectors of 
national affairs. According to the military, helping to 
orient the population towards a positive attitude about a 
democratic system, neutralizing the guerrilla threat, gaining 
popular support in the fight against the guerrillas, and 
collecting information for intelligence that may prevent 
potential domestic conflict are all appropriate functions.49 
The autonomy of the military from domestic elites has grown 
along with its economic power, which means that the military 
institution facing the new civilian president had definite 
prerogatives and an entrenched power base to control them*50
When Vinicio Cerezo took office in 1986 hopes were high 
that a new era of civilian control had begun. The new 
constitution described the nature of the military role like 
this, "Es unico e indivisible, esencialmente professional, 
apolitico, obediente y no deliberante.I|51 ("It is unique and 
indivisible, essentially professional, apolitical, obedient, 
and does not deliberate.") In the beginning of his term,
49Ejercito de Guatemala, Direccion de Asuntos Civiles, 
Conceptos doctrinarios de asuntos civiles, May 1988, 12, 15,
1 Rlu «
50Barry, 39-44.
51Ejercito de Guatemala, 28.
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Cerezo appeared to have a limited amount of influence with the 
military. Cerezo installed moderate officers to positions of 
importance within the military, notably the office of Defense 
Minister.52 This Minister holds a great deal of power in the 
government and over the military institution as well.53 The 
support of the officer in this post is essential to a civilian 
president, without it controlling the armed forces would be 
difficult to impossible. In a significant step, General Jaime 
Hernandez Mendez was appointed to the post of Defense 
Minister, preventing the army's chief of staff, General 
Rodolfo Lobos, forced into retirement and known for his 
terrible human rights reputation, from assuming the post.54
Although Hernandez was an old line officer, Cerezo 
appointed General Hector Gramajo to the number two post, chief 
of staff.55 General Hernandez was scheduled for mandatory 
retirement soon thereafter, setting the stage for General 
Hector Gramajo, the new chief of staff, to succeed Hernandez 
upon his retirement. Grama jo was one of the most moderate 
officers in the Guatemalan military, and was seen as 
supportive of the new constitutional system. This all took
52Sam Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo Wins Battle With Army," 
Miami Herald. 10 January 1986, in Information Service of Latin 
America, hereafter cited as ISLA.
53Keef e, 194.
54Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo."
55Richard Millett, "Guatemala," B302.
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place quietly, and it seemed that Cerezo had won an initial 
victory over the armed forces.56
Open conflict with the military was rare, but rumors of 
coup attempts were not uncommon, revealing underlying 
tensions.57 A more obvious manifestation was the removal of 
the civilian chief of police Cerezo appointed early in his 
term, and his replacement by a colonel. Military pressure 
seems to have been the cause for the change, although the 
public excuse was that the civilian could not cut down on 
street crime*58 But, as planned, Hernandez was retired on 
January 31, 1987, and General Gramajo became the Defense
Minister.59
Dissent within the military was responsible for coup 
attempts in 1988 and 1989 (to be discussed further below) . 
They were possibly aimed as much at Defense Minister Gramajo 
as at President Cerezo, because Gramajo was seen as more 
moderate than some in the military would like. The harder 
line military officers saw Gramajo's relationship with Cerezo 
as too close. At the time, Grama jo was able to easily put
56Dillon, "Guatemala's Cerezo."
57Millett, "Guatemala," B302-B303.
58Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon'."
59Millett, "Guatemala," B303.
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down the coup attempts, but the tensions ran deep.60
The splits in the military were not over whether they 
should control society, but what methods were to be used. By 
late 1989, after the two coup attempts, the hard line seemed 
to be gaining control, favoring repression as a response to 
popular groups,61 In May 1990, Gramajo retired, and General 
Juan Leonel Bolanos (hard line) was named Defense Minister. 
General Juan Jose Marroquln was named chief of staff, and 
General Roberto Matta became deputy chief of staff. There was 
some resistance to the appointments, but they proceeded. The 
military seemed to have consolidated a hard line position, and 
Guatemala experienced a surge of violence.62
Very soon, though, General Marroquln retired, and General 
Matta moved up to the chief of staff position, likely to be 
the next Defense Minister. Matta was linked to Gramajo's 
faction of the military, and so there was hope that the 
moderates still had influence within the military. Until 
another shift, though, the military was leaning towards a hard
60Lee Hockstader, "Guatemala Puts Down Coup Attempt," 
Washington Post. 10 May 1989, in ISLA.
61Robert H. Trudeau, "Guatemala" in Latin American. and
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 8 eds. James M. Malloy and 
Eduardo Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), B252.
62Robert H. Trudeau, "Guatemala," to appear in Latin 
American and Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 9 eds. James 
M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra (New York; Holmes and Meier, 
1992) .
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line. The changes in military office seem to reflect 
shifts within the military itself, rather than the amount of 
civilian control, although both are a part of the dynamic.
The prerogatives of the military are a little difficult 
to identify in this scenario. Although Cerezo appeared to 
have some influence in the beginning, over time this became 
secondary to the internal workings of the military itself. In 
the beginning, the army seemed to have lower levels of 
prerogatives with regard to military appointments than in the 
second half of Cerezo's term, but this may only reflect the 
interplay of the factions within the armed forces.
THE MILITARY AS AN ECONOMIC PLAYER
The military not only holds control of Guatemala through 
physical force, but represents a major economic player as 
well. In addition to personal enrichment through corruption, 
military officers became entrepreneurs. This enabled them to 
diversify into many sectors of the economy, such as hotels, 
housing projects, the cement industry, cattle ranching, rubber 
production, the national airline, telecommunications and other 
industrial and commercial enterprises.64 Most notable,
63Ibid.
^Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election," 96-97; and James 
Painter, Guatemala: False Hope. False Freedom (London:
Catholic Institute for International Relations/Latin American 
Bureau Limited, 1987), 47-50.
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perhaps, are the army's bank, El Banco del Ejercito, and the 
acquisition of vast tracts of land in the Northern Transversal 
Strip (FTN) for livestock, agriculture and forestry.65 
Military control over state enterprises aided officers in 
enriching themselves. Public money funded the army's bank, 
which in turn funded the enterprises of the officers. 
Military leaders have also been accused of enriching 
themselves through arms trading*66
Another area where the military is possibly involved in 
corruption is drug trafficking.67 In the late 1980s, 
Guatemala became the major transhipment point for Colombian 
cocaine, as well as a leading producer of opium poppies, which 
are processed into heroin, 'mainly in Mexico.68 Guatemala is 
also a large producer of marijuana.69 In its 1990 report, 
the International Narcotics Control Board expressed concern
65Painter, False Hope, 47-50; Trudeau, "Guatemalan 
Election," 97; and James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A
Political History of Modern Central America (London: Verso,
1988), 466-467.
66Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election," 97; Painter, False Hope,
47-50; and Barry, 41.
67CERIGUA, "'War on Drugs in Guatemala" vol. 4 (September 
1990), 2, 9.
“ CERIGUA, "War on Drugs," 3; CSUCAPAX, "Criticas por 
ausencia de Guatemala en la cumbre americana," Centroamerica 
Hov No. 30 (5 November 1989), 17; and Lindsey Gruson, "U.S. 
Pinning Hopes on Guatemalan Army for Stability and for War 
Against Drugs," New York Times, 5 July 1990, in ISLA.
69"Guerra al narcotrafico," Cronica. 8 December 1988, 23- 
24; and "En la mira de la droga," Cronica, 4 August 1988, 12.
49
over the significant increase in illegal drug cultivation, 
production and transhipment.70 Accusations have been made 
that corruption related to narcotics reaches into the highest 
levels of government and society. Alfonso Cabrera, a 
presidential candidate in 1990 and close friend of Vinicio 
Cerezo was repeatedly implicated.71 The chief of Cerezo*s 
anti-corruption office has been incriminated through the 
arrests of close associates, illustrating the extensive 
corruption.72
The military has increasingly been connected with 
narcotics trafficking, in spite of its close collaboration 
with the U.S. in the war on drugs. The U.S. has turned to the 
armed forces in Guatemala as the only viable institution for 
help in the fight against drugs. As in other Latin American 
countries, in turning to the military, the U.S. may be helping 
to create a new mission for the armed forces. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the focus of the military mission centered on
70United Nations, International Narcotics Control Board, 
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 1990. 
37.
71CERIGUA, "War on Drugs," 3; "Amapola, lindisima 
amapola," Cronica. 28 July 1989, 15-16; Kenneth Freed,
"Guatemala Seen Slipping into a Haven for Drugs," Los Angeles 
Times. 30 August 1989, in ISLA; Lindsey Gruson, "Finding a 
Lush Home in Guatemala Drug Trafficking and Poppy Growing,” 
New York Times. 1 October 1989, in ISLA; and Robert H. 
Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
72Freed, "Haven for Drugs;" and John McClintock, 
"Colombians Turn to Guatemala for Cocaine Smuggling," Miami 
Herald. 23 November 1989, in ISLA.
50
internal security. With the changing context of transition to 
civilian government and changing world politics, the military 
faced a reassessment of its central mission. If antinarcotics 
becomes the military's new mission, the dangers to a 
democratic system are evident. This would lead to increased 
military intelligence activity, as well as expanded roles in 
police activities, politics and decision-making.73
Repeated claims have also been made linking drug
trafficking with guerrilla groups inside Guatemala.74 The 
validity of these accusations is questionable and is denied by 
URNG leaders. No conclusive evidence exists. This allows the 
Guatemalan military to pursue counter-insurgency with US help 
under the guise of fighting a war on drugs.75 In turning to 
the military, the U.S. dependence on army intelligence may 
have increased the opportunity for corruption in the military, 
with involvement in operations dealing with cocaine money. 
The military may become more corrupt with advantages
collaboration with the U.S. provides. In spite of this, the
^Louis W. Goodman and Johanna S.R. Mendelson, "The Threat 
of New Missions: Latin American Militaries and the Drug War,"
in The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military
Relations in Latin America, eds. Louis W. Goodman, Johanna
S.R. Mendelson and Juan Rial (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books,
1990), 189-193.
74Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S_,. 
Narcotics Control Programs Overseas: A Continuing Assessment,
100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, Committee Print, 5; and
"Lindisima amapola,” 15.
^CERIGUA, "War on Drugs,” 2, 6.
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U.S. claims that although, some military officers may be 
involved in illegal drug trafficking, the institution as a 
whole is not.76 Commanders of certain remote or border zones 
may be particularly susceptible to corruption.77 For 
example, ten drug smugglers were arrested in 1990. Their 
leader, Colonel Marco Antonio Lopez, was second in command of 
the Quiche army base.78It is reported that Colombian 
traffickers pay $50,000 for each flight which stops at a 
Guatemalan airfield en route to the United States.79
The occasion for graft in the area of narcotics 
trafficking for the Guatemalan armed forces appears to be wide 
open, aided by the special relationship in this area between 
the U.S. and the Guatemalan military, ie. U.S. reliance on 
Guatemalan military intelligence and cooperation. The army’s 
special role in the economic life of the country, as well as 
possible and continued involvement in drug production and 
transhipment, gives added incentive for the military to 
protect its autonomy and its control of the countryside (used 
for clandestine transhipment and production).
76Colum Lynch, "U.S.: Guatemala Army Must Fight Drug
War," Miami Herald. 30 April 1990, in ISLA; Gruson, "Pinning 
Hopes;'1 and Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
^Freed, "Haven for Drugs."
78CERIGUA, "War on Drugs," 6, 9.
^David Adams, "U.S. Intensifies War on Drugs in 
Guatemala," Miami Herald. 10 July 1989, in ISLA; and CERIGUA, 
"War on Drugs," 10.
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DIVISIONS IN THE MILITARY
As mentioned above the military and its officers are 
prominent economic players in Guatemala, but not all military 
personnel benefitted equally. The greediness of officers 
based in Guatemala City, where more opportunities for graft 
existed, caused discontent among junior officers in the rural 
areas.80 In addition, these junior officers resented 
carrying out the costly counterinsurgency campaign while not 
sharing equally in the spoils.81
Divisions also existed over just what tactics were 
acceptable to destroy the guerrillas.82 It seems that the 
goals of the military were fairly uniform, but the methods 
caused some dispute. The necessity of removing subversives is 
a given, but using tactics like the scorched earth policy of 
eradicating peasants that could form bases of support for 
guerrillas caused dissent. The Guatemalan military sees 
itself as the guardian of the state, but also as a director of 
internal policy, not only that dealing with eradicating 
communist insurgents. Although there may be a few officers 
who believe in civilian rule, more often than not, they simply 
understand that a nominal civilian government is necessary for
80Painter, False Hope. 51.
81 Barry, 44-45; and Jennifer Schirmer, "Waging War to
Prevent War," The Nation. 10 April 1989, 479.
82Bowen, "Prospects for Liberalization," 44; and Barry,
44.
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international reasons.83
So, while still dominating the bureaucracy and the state, 
the military can leave behind some of the details of every day 
issues and concentrate on counterinsurgency. The civilian 
leaders provide the external face Guatemala needs in the 
international environment.84 Although possibly overstated 
that, "Cerezo provides a veneer of legitimacy to the murderers 
- the Guatemalan army," the point cannot be entirely 
denied.85
A retreat from direct government could cause further 
debate within the military. First of all, since divisions 
exist over how to handle the counter insurgency war, and the 
military now has more time to devote to this, greater problems 
may arise. Secondly, the choice to allow a civilian elected 
president has also presented another cause for disunion. At 
least one group of lower to middle officers, hard liners on 
the counterinsurgency issue, see the officers important in the 
new regime as being agents of civilian president Vinicio 
Cerezo1s party —  the Christian Democrats. To them this 
translates into being "instruments of the Communists."86
83Trudeau, "Guatemalan Election," 99; Painter, "Civilian 
Garb," 819; and Schirmer, 478-479.
^Lernoux, "Military Order," 557.
85Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
86Schirmer, 479.
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Although this group may be a minority, debate continues within 
the military as to the extent of the political opening, and 
some do believe that Defense Minister Hector Gramajo went too 
far in his relationship with President Cerezo.87 The two 
coup attempts of May 1988 and May 1989 were directed as much 
against Defense Minister Gramajo as President Cerezo, 
reflecting the continuing divisions between hard and soft- 
liners within the military.88 These divisions within the 
military will be part of the dynamic in the relationship with 
the civilian government in the process of transition.
87Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B268.
88Richard Boudreaux, "Revolt in Guatemala, While Easily 
Quelled, Points to Wider Grievances," Los Angeles Times, 18 
May 1989, in ISLA.
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CHAPTER THREE
ESTABLISHING PREROGATIVES
Before the installation of Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo as 
president in 1986, the military already had historically 
established prerogatives, areas of potential conflict. 
Several prerogative issues can be identified: security
issues, accountability for past and continuing human rights 
abuses by the military, control over military structure and 
the power to define the military's role in society. Some of 
these prerogatives were made very explicit by the military 
prior to the transition (see below), while others were less 
visible.
The range of security issues for which the military 
claimed prerogatives is large. Included in this category are 
a free hand to continue the counterinsurgency campaign, 
control of the countryside, the intelligence role of the 
military, and resistance to talks with the guerrillas 
(Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity ■— * URNG). These 
issues are, of course, interrelated, as are the somewhat 
arbitrary broader categories. Human rights concerns are very 
closely related to security issues. The main prerogative is
56
amnesty for past military violators for crimes committed 
during the counterinsurgency war; however, it also includes a 
clear-cut statement that the military is not subject to the 
civilian legal system or is immune. Throughout Cerezo's term 
security forces remained free from punishment through civilian 
courts (to be discussed below under HUMAN RIGHTS).
The military wanted to retain control over its own 
structure, be free to decide its role in society, and to have 
power over the President in the area of military promotions. 
All of these prerogatives were subject to change in magnitude, 
contributing to a general sense of the nature of civil- 
military relations. Before examining each of these areas over 
the course of Cerezo*s presidency, as well as indications of 
conflict such as coup attempts, it will be useful to point out 
the visible, obvious conditions imposed by the military before 
the transition. These conditions clearly identify several 
areas where the military felt it held a strong prerogative.
LIMITATIONS BEFORE INAUGURATION
Since 1966 elections in Guatemala have 
provided legitimacy for counter­
insurgency programmes and have not 
announced major shifts in political 
power. There was little to suggest in 
the victory of the DCG that the 1985 
elections marked a significant departure 
from the pattern.1
1Painter, "Civilian Garb," 844.
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It is clear that the military intended to control the
Guatemalan state even after a transition to elected civilian
government. Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo believed that, upon taking
office in 1986, he would hold 25 percent of power and end his
term with 75 percent.2 Whether this was true or not, the
military still called the shots. Facing this situation,
Cerezo noted in his inaugural address:
Authority does not mean power. These are 
two very different concepts. Power must 
be subordinated to authority, because 
power without responsible authority is 
tyranny and many of those who preceded us 
apparently did not know the difference.3
Before allowing for the installation of a civilian 
president, the military took measures to protect itself and 
limit civilian authority. Most importantly, perhaps, the 
military declared a general amnesty for past violators of 
human rights during the counterinsurgency war, firmly 
establishing immunity from prosecution.4 Thus, Cerezo could
2John H. Fish, "A 'Democratic Opening' in Guatemala," 
The Christian Century. 11 May 1988, 470.
3Vinicio Cerezo, "Inaugural Address" (14 January 1986), 
in Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 5, 
ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988),
C195.
4Fish, 470-471; and Marjorie Miller, "Families Call for 
Justice for Guatemala's Missing," Los Angeles Times, in I SLA.
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not prosecute military officers for political crimes. The 
military also legalized its control of the countryside, and 
provided for the establishment of the State Security Council, 
to be headed always by the army secretary of intelligence 
(clearly identifying control in the area of intelligence). 
This was designed to limit the control of civilian Cabinet 
members, under whose jurisdiction certain national security 
issues would otherwise have fallen. In return for working 
within these limitations, Cerezo hoped to be able to serve out 
his term. But, the military held the power and the political 
murders continued.5 In fact, as a result of the political 
opening with the election of Cerezo, the death toll rose.6 
After an initial decline at the beginning of the civilian 
administration, political violence rose throughout the term, 
and intensified at the time of the elections in late 1990.7
HUMAN RIGHTS
Although murders by the military were less than in 
periods before the transition, they continued after Cerezo's
5Nairn and Simon, 13-14.
6Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
7Amnesty International, "Guatemala: Amnesty
International's Current Human Rights Concerns" AMR 34/01/91 
(January 1991), 1; and Human Rights Watch, "Guatemala," in
Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 1991), 170.
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inauguration.8 Academics, students, trade unionists, 
journalists, street children, politicians, and especially 
human rights activists were the principal targets as the human 
rights situation deteriorated throughout his administration.9 
Considerable deterioration, which began in 1989, persisted 
into 1990, as the traditional brutality continued.10 The 
U.S., initially supportive of the civilian administration, 
publicly criticized Guatemala in 1990. In March, U.S. 
Ambassador Thomas F. Strook was recalled to Washington for a 
short time as a rebuke, openly criticizing the government 
before he left.11 The U.S. State Department reported that 
the escalating violence in Guatemala was primarily a result of 
a lack of government authority over security forces.12 
Though Defense Minister Gramajo may have been Cerezo*s ally, 
no military consensus existed recognizing the necessity of 
ending the violence. Without such an understanding, Gramajo
8Dan Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon' May Be Over," 
Los Anaeles Times, 17 February 1987, in ISLA.
9Amnesty International, 1; and Human Rights Watch, 170.
10Richard Millett, "Limited Hopes and Fears in Guatemala," 
Current History (March 1991): 127.
11Lewis H. Diuguid, "U.S. Recalls Ambassador in Rebuke to 
Guatemala on Human Rights," Washington Post, 8 March 1990, in 
ISLA; and Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
12Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1990 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1991), 631.
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did not possess enough control over the military to stop the 
abuses.13 Military human rights abuses continued almost 
unchecked, and as a result, U.S. military assistance 
deliveries were suspended in December of 1990.14 The 
historical legacy of human rights violations by the military 
carried on as a hard line approach seemed, to be returning, a 
result of shifts in the military command (to be discussed 
below) .15
President Cerezo and his civilian government were unable 
to hold the military accountable for past human rights 
violations or continued abuses. Early in his presidency, 
Cerezo made a move against the police force's Department of 
Technical Investigations (DIT). This organization was 
notorious for its involvement in political murders. Both 
civilians and the military recognized the corrupt nature of 
the DIT, which lacked support within the military, or in 
essence allies, in the face of Cerezo's action.16 On 
February 4, 1986, the DIT1s offices were penetrated by a
special police battalion, and the 600 agents of the 
organization were detained. Only 115 were discharged, while
13Richard Millett, phone interview by author, 16 March
1992.
14U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports," 631.
15Trudeau, "Guatemala," (1992).
16Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
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the rest were offered retraining and new positions in the 
police force. Although agents were fired, a precedent of 
prosecution was not set.17 Prosecution of DIT members would 
have set a precedent too similar to the prosecution of other 
uniformed officers, such as the military.18 In consideration 
of military opposition, though, it seems that Cerezo discarded 
plans to name a civilian to head the national police, and 
named a retired colonel instead.19
Striking the DIT, however, was very different than
censuring the military, as the following illustrates:
However infamous, the DIT was only a 
subordinate organ that executed orders.
Cerezo has cured a symptom, but the 
cancer remains. At the heart of the 
terror apparatus, in Guatemala, is the 
military, studiously preparing its lists 
of victims through the army's 
intelligence services (G-2).20
Although Cerezo announced that he would establish a commission
to investigate the fate of the disappeared, he stayed his
stated course of avoiding prosecution of members of the
17Robert J. McCartney, "Guatemala's New Ruler Moves 
Gingerly on Rights and Economy," Washington Post, 12 March 
1986, in ISLA.
18Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
19Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemalan Stays in Step With Army," 
New York Times, 11 May 1986, in ISLA.
20Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," in Latin American and
Caribbean Contemporary Record vol. 5, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal 
(New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988), B310.
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military.21 The office of Human Rights Ombudsman was
created, but remained ineffectual, along with the Human Rights 
Commission.22
Under the provisions of Esquipulas II, Guatemala, along 
with the other Central American states, made a commitment to 
engage in a national dialogue, but although formally in 
existence, the talks held with the armed opposition 
accomplished little. The amnesty decreed as part of 
Esquipulas II applied to the military as well as the 
opposition. Considerable doubt as to the government's ability 
to ensure guerrillas safety has resulted in few guerrillas 
willing to lay down their arms and turn themselves in.23 The 
situation of conflict continued to deteriorate in 1989 and 
1990 as well.24
There was no need for the Army to contest this 
prerogative (human rights), because the new civilian 
government did just what the military wanted. The new 
President made it clear that decree 8-86, the general amnesty
21Kinzer, "Guatemalan Stays in Step."
22Trudeau, "Guatemala,1 B249-250.
23LASA Commission on Compliance with the Central America 
Peace Accord, 15 March 1988, "Extraordinary Opportunities . .
and New Risks, " in Latin American and Caribbean 
Contemporary Record vol. 7, eds. James M. Malloy and Eduardo 
Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), C14, C16-17, C29-
30.
24Richard Millett, "Limited Hopes," 127.
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for the military, would not be repealed.25 During Cerezo*s
term in office, not one military officer was convicted for
human rights violations.26 After the Center for Criminal
Justice at Harvard Law School spent two years attempting to
aid Guatemala in improving the administration of justice with
little success, the director of the Center concluded:
It seems clear to us that the current 
government of Guatemala is prepared to 
tolerate the familiar, terrible forms of 
violent repression— disappearances,
torture, and death— carried out by 
private groups or dissident security 
forces or, perhaps by the highest levels 
of army intelligence.27
In the only case where police agents were convicted, the
decision was later overturned, upholding a tradition of no
accountability for human rights violations by security
forces.28 "They are proud of their impunity: Guatemalan
officers are not prosecuted for crimes against civilians.
They are proud of the fear they inspire."29
25Richard Millett, "Guatemala," B303.
26Joyce Hackel, "Guatemala Shifts Right With Choice of 
President," Christian Science Monitor. 8 January 1991, in 
ISLA.
27Philip Benjamin Heymann, "Letter to President Vinicio 
Cerezo," Hemisphere (Fall 1990): 9.
28Amnesty International, 1; and Human Rights Watch, ISO-
29Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B267.
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U.S. ROLE
"Guatemala is a proud, independent country that dares say 
'no* to the Yankees."30 In 1977, the Carter administration 
suspended military aid to Guatemala because of a horrible 
human rights record.31 The military refused the U.S. aid in 
anticipation of the cutoff and Carter administration demands 
that human rights be improved, illustrating the independent, 
at times belligerent, attitude which continues today.32 It 
is reported that as a result of the U.S. aid cutoff, ". . .
some top military commanders here [Guatemala] gave an 
unexpected response: They laughed."33
Was the suspension of U.S. military aid effective in 
promoting a transition to civilian government in Guatemala? 
Many times aid is used to try to further the foreign policy 
goals of the donor state by influencing the recipient. An 
examination of what the aims of the U.S. were in withholding 
aid, what the outcomes were, and what part the aid actually 
played could help in evaluating the impact of U.S. foreign 
assistance on the transition. The following describes the
30Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1990), B262.
31Department of State, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service: Latin American Daily Report (5 August 1986), P13.
Hereafter cited as FBIS.
32Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy," 40.
33Brook Lamer, "Army Flaunts Its Independence," C h m stlan 
Science Monitor, in ISLA.
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goals of US foreign assistance:
The ultimate, but usually unstated, 
justification for all forms of foreign 
assistance is to gain political influence 
for the United States within a particular 
Third World country. The logic of 
foreign aid in this context is relatively 
simple: The greater the amount of U.S.
economic and military aid to a Third 
World country, the greater that nation's 
willingness to comply with the foreign 
policy wishes of the United States.34
The problem is that aid does not work exactly in this way.
Although some influence is gained for the U.S. through aid,
the recipients retain a degree of independence, not
necessarily proportional to the amount of aid received. Third
World states have a wide range in their actions despite
accepting aid from the U.S. For example, even with threats
from the U.S., Guatemala would not ratify a U.S.-sponsored
document condemning Nicaragua for much destabilization in the
region.35
One of the U.S. goals in Guatemala was to see a 
democratic government. In 1984, elections were held for a 
Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution and prepare 
for the scheduled elections in 19 8 5 . 36 Thus, Guatemala
34Doug Bandow, "Economic and Military Aid," in 
Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third
World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1989), 80.
35Ibid. , 81.
36Piero Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1988), B299-B301.
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seemed to be moving in a promising democratic direction, with 
hopes for civilian rule and the curtailment of human rights 
abuses.
Stated U.S. goals are not always the only objective in 
granting assistance. The Carter administration focused on 
promoting development issues and human rights,37 while the 
Reagan White House claimed to support transition to democracy. 
The Reagan administration also had a much more favorable view 
of Guatemala than the Carter White House. Reagan was seen in 
Central America as meaning more direct U.S. aid,38 though the 
U.S. Congress still opposed military aid to Guatemala because 
of continued human rights abuses.39 The stated goal of the 
Reagan administration may have been secondary to securing 
stability in Guatemala. After Cerezo was inaugurated, U.S. 
military aid helped stabilize the system in Guatemala by 
helping Cerezo stay in office. The assistance aided in 
placating the military.40
The way in which Guatemala obtained military equipment
37Dario Moreno, U.S. Policy in Central America: The
Endless Debate (Miami: Florida International University
Press, 1990), 23-24.
38FBIS (13 November 1984), P8.
39Gordon L. Bowen, "Guatemala: A New Form of
Totalitarianism?" Commonweal, 10 February 1984, 78.
40Thomas Carothers, "The Reagan Years: The 1980s," in
Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America
Themes and Issues, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991), 100-101.
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during U.S. sanctions introduces a complicating element. Some 
military goods were sent to Guatemala quietly, against the 
wishes of the U.S. Congress. While downplaying the human 
rights abuses of the military in Guatemala, the Reagan 
administration appears to have been secretly supplying 
military aid until the election of a civilian, Vinicio Cerezo, 
when open military assistance could be resumed.41
Another source of military goods and advisors was Israel. 
Israel became Guatemala's main supplier after the Carter 
administration cutoff. Not only did Israel supply military 
hardware, but training and advisors in the counterinsurgency 
as well. The U.S. had found a surrogate for sending aid to 
Guatemala, along with other Third World states.42 It can be 
argued that even if the U.S. did not encourage these transfers 
to Guatemala, they could have been stopped. Israel is very 
dependent on U.S. aid, and it would be difficult for Israel to 
make arms sales which the U.S. disapproved of.43 Further 
exerting its independence, Guatemala built a munitions factory 
for its Israeli-made rifles.44
At any rate, the Guatemalans did not seem too troubled by 
the lack of U.S. military aid. As has been noted,
41Nairn, 20-22.
42Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy," 40, 43.
43Nairn, 22.
44Larmer, "Flaunts Independence."
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•Elections are to impress the gringos, ' a 
prosperous businessman said. 'It's the 
only way we can get U.S. foreign aid 
again. But we'll get by in any case. We 
have the Israelis and the Taiwanese.,45
There is indication that the military did not suffer from the
loss of U.S. military aid. Funds which might have gone into
development projects were used to purchase military equipment,
so other sectors of society suffered, not the one targeted by
the U.S.46
Even after U.S. military aid was restored with elections 
for civilian government (see TABLE 5, Chapter Two), relations 
between the two were not smooth. One area which created 
tensions between the two countries was Nicaragua. While the 
Reagan administration was actively seeking to overthrow the 
Sandinistas, Guatemala followed a policy of active neutrality. 
President Cerezo played an active and independent role in 
Central America, which irritated the U.S. Cerezo followed a 
policy involving the idea that it was possible for a 
democratic government to coexist with a pro-Communist regime 
in Central America.47 Guatemala continued its historically 
independent stance. With regards to Guatemalan policy on the 
Sandinistas it has been said:
45Victor Perera, "Chaos in the Scorched Earth," The 
Nation, 28 January 1984, 93.
46FBIS (8 August 1988), 13.
47Millett, "Guatemala," B308-B311.
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It might change in the future . . . at a 
price. As Guatemalan officers are fond 
of saying, there are expensive 
prostitutes, there are cheap prostitutes, 
and there are the Hondurans, who give it 
for nothing. If U.S. officials want 
their help, they must first pay—  
providing far more generous assistance 
than Congress was willing to grant in 
1985.48
But Cerezo continued his diplomatic efforts in the region, 
without serious reprisals from the U.S.49 It was more 
important as part of the anti-Sandinista campaign to be able 
to portray Nicaragua as the only non-democratic government in 
Central America. For this reason, the civilian government 
could not be allowed to fail.50
Some have argued that President Cerezo, in playing a 
leading role in the Central American Peace process, also 
attempted to gain leverage with the military in Guatemala. 
Measures provided for by Esquipulas II called for free and 
fair elections, national reconciliation, dialogue with armed 
opposition and respect for human rights. These provisions, if 
observed, would lessen military control of the political 
system.51
Although the U.S. withheld military aid longer than other
48Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1988), B307.
49Gleijeses, "Guatemala," (1990), B262.
50Millett, "Guatemala," B311.
51Dario Moreno, Struggle for Peace in Central America 
(Gainsville: University of Florida Presses) forthcoming.
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forms of assistance, Guatemala does not seem to have suffered 
enough to cause a change in policy. The U.S. saw a civilian 
government elected, but the prospects for a meaningful 
transition look grim.52 Guatemala retained an independent 
attitude, in spite of past sanctions. U.S. efforts at 
influencing Guatemala through aid were not effective.
MILITARY BUDGET
As TABLE 6 illustrates, the military budget in relation 
to total government expenditures rose significantly in the 
five years prior to the transition. In 1986 the military 
budget began to level out in comparative terms, but at a 
higher level than the beginning of the 1980s. The decline in 
military budget as a percentage of total government 
expenditures (not including foreign assistance) at first 
appears puzzling. It might be expected that the military 
would challenge the civilian government to retain high 
military spending levels.
As a result of general economic crisis, the Guatemalan 
government budget as a whole was shrinking in terms of U.S. 
dollar value. The value of the quetzal in relation to the 
dollar was allowed to float in 1986, bringing the dollar value 
of the budget down. In the context of a constricting budget, 
military expenditures in U.S. dollar value declined after the
52Millett, "Limited Hopes," 125, 127.
71
TABLE 6 (see Note)
GUATEMALAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
MILITARY 
EXPEND­
ITURE IN 
MILLIONS 
OF
QUETZALES
TOTAL
GOVERNMENT 
EXPEND­
ITURES IN 
MILLIONS OF 
QUETZALES
MILITARY 
EXPEND­
ITURE AS 
PERCENT­
AGE OF 
TOTAL
GOVERN­
MENT
MILITARY
EXPEND­
ITURES
IN
MILLIONS 
OF U.S. 
DOLLARS
U.S.
MILITARY 
AID IN 
MILLIONS 
OF U.S. 
DOLLARS
1981 161 1335.1 12.1% 161
1982 208 1121.0 18.5% 208 .— .
1983 231 1015.7 22.7% 231
1984 270 1019.2 26.5% 270 —
1985 371 1039.7 35.7% 371 0.5
1986 378 1663.6 22.7% 201.6 5.4
1987 495 2087.3 23 .7% 198 5.5
1988 645 2530.0 25.5% 246.2 9.4
1989 623 2933.9 21.2% 221.2 9.4
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 168; Banco de
Guatemala, "Boletin Estadlstico" (April-June 1990), 32; Banco 
de Guatemala, "Boletin Estadlstico" (October-December 1985), 
32; Agency for International Development, Office of Planning 
and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, 
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from 
International Organizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1982), 48; Agency for
International Development, Office of Planning and Budgeting, 
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas 
Loans and Grants and Assistance from International 
Organizations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1987), 51; Agency for International Development,
Office of Planning and Budgeting, Bureau for Program and 
Policy Coordination, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and 
Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 51; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 41 no.l 
(January 1988), 238; and International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics 45 no. 1 (January 1992), 
258.Note; All figures are given in current prices. The military
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expenditures were taken from the SIPRI Yearbook, and the total 
government expenditure figures from the "Boletin Estadlstico." 
The author used these figures to calculate the percentage 
military expenditures comprise of total expenditures. The 
exchange rates used to convert military expenditures from 
quetzales to U.S. dollars were taken from the International 
Monetary Fund.
transition, though as a percentage of the government budget 
they remained relatively stable (see TABLE 6). This decline 
in military spending made the need for U.S. military 
assistance greater. U.S. military assistance helped 
supplement the dollar value of the armed forces' budget. One 
of the goals of the Guatemalan military in allowing the 
transition was to access U.S. military assistance. As a 
result of the election of a civilian president, the U.S. once 
again supplied military assistance to Guatemala, beginning 
with a small amount in 1985 and considerable increases in the 
following years (see TABLE 6) . Perhaps in preparation for the 
transition, the military appeared to pad their budget up to 
the time of the transition; however, this does not explain the 
drop in military expenditures after 1985. My argument is that 
the decline in government spending on the military (in U.S. 
dollars) reflected the overall shrinking of the entire 
government budget rather than civilian attempts to reduce the 
military's budget. In short, obvious challenges to civilian 
authority in the area of the budget were not evident.
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SECURITY ISSUES
Several important prerogatives are included in security 
issues. They are related to the military's control of the 
countryside mentioned above. Continuing the violence and 
counter-insurgency war, Civil Defense Patrols, and preventing 
talks between the government and URNG are facilitated by the 
military's monopoly on force. Although conditions improved in 
the beginning of Cerezo*s term, political murders and 
disappearances quickly picked up, an illustration of the 
military's confidence in its position.53
That the military gave up no authority to civilians in 
the countryside was illustrated by the presence of Civil 
Defense Patrols. Even though the new constitution states that 
Civil Defense Patrols are voluntary, the rural male population 
was still forced to serve by the military or face possible 
consequences. The government failed to protect the rights of 
its rural citizens.54 In response to pleas from Indians that 
they were being conscripted into service, the government 
reaffirmed the constitutional premise that the patrols are 
voluntary, but was unwilling to take action. Without 
government protection, it can be dangerous for people to
53Kenneth Freed, "Rights Abuse Increase Reported in 
Guatemala," Los Angeles Times. 25 November 1988, in ISLA.
54Gleijeses, "Guatemala" (1990), B266.
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demand their rights in this context.55
Preventing talks between guerrilla groups, especially the 
URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity), the 
government, and most importantly the military, has been high 
on the agenda. In the fall of 1986, prospects for talks with 
the URNG looked promising, but under pressure from the 
military, Cerezo reversed his position, ending chances for the 
moment,56 On a trip to Spain, he had proposed negotiations 
with the guerrillas, but withdrew the offer upon his return to 
Guatemala. The military had published reports and pictures 
portraying the brutality of the insurgents and claiming that 
talks could not be held with such groups.57
Under the guidelines of the Central American Peace 
Accords, Guatemala was to hold negotiations with the armed 
insurgency. Some symbolic talks were held in 1988, with the 
military notably absent. Without military support, real 
progress was not made, and by late 1989, the National Dialogue 
structure initiated earlier that year stalled. The National 
Dialogue was created as a nongovernmental organization under 
the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR). The talks were
55Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemala: What Has Democracy
Wrought?" New York Times, .2 6 March 1989, in ISLA.
56Millett, "Guatemala," B304.
57Williams, "Guatemalan's 'Honeymoon'."
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held between religious, business, and party leaders.58 
Fifteen working committees were to discuss social, political 
and economic issues. Part of the failure of the National
Dialogue was that the URNG was excluded from direct
participation and the military chose to boycott the talks.59
Although talks between the URNG and popular sectors were 
somewhat promising, for any future talks to be meaningful, the 
Guatemalan military would have to soften its stance toward the 
rebels. In March of 1990, Arturo Isaacs, a military
spokesman, stated that the armed forces would support Cerezo 
in allowing talks with the guerrillas through the CNR without 
the rebels first disarming.60 But, with a change in Defense 
Minister in May 1990 (discussed in chapter 2) , the military 
appeared to be moving towards a harder line with regard to the 
guerrillas. Popular representatives scheduled to meet with 
the URNG were warned by the military not to reach agreements 
on too many issues. The new Defense Minister, General
Bolanos, stated that the Army would not negotiate with the 
rebels until they disarmed, and the URNG said that it would 
not disarm until "conditions for true democracy and peace
58Trudeau, "Guatemala" (1992).
59Trudeau, "Guatemala" (1991), B246-247.
6 ° c s u C A P A X ,  "Violaciones de derechos humanos deterioran 
nexos con EE.UU.," Centroamerica Hoy No. 38 (23 March 1990), 
3.
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exist in Guatemala.1,61 Although direct talks with the 
military were not held, meetings with other sectors in society 
continued. In September 1990, the URNG met with the Comite 
Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, 
Industriales y Financieras (CACIF) in Canada. Although no 
agreements were concluded, both parties gave positive 
evaluations of the talks aimed at finding a peaceful solution 
to the conflict.62
So, although some talks were held, the military 
effectively kept real negotiations off the agenda. The 
military had a strong prerogative in this area, and was 
willing to contest civilian authority, but fortunately not to 
the point of removing civilian government. Public pressure 
grew in Guatemala as the military was more and more seen as 
part of the problem and not the solution.63 The military 
retained a high level of prerogative in this area, and with a 
monopoly on force and the ability to veto direct talks between 
the URNG and itself, the military effectively prevented 
meaningful discussion with the armed opposition during the 
Cerezo administration.
61Ibid.
62CSUCAPAX, "Campana electoral marcada por atentados y
denuncias," Centroamerica Hoy" No. 47 (20 September 1990), 13.
63Ibid.
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COUPS AND CHANGE 
Military coup attempts in May of 1988 and May of 1989 
provided tangible reminders of the possibility of military 
intervention into politics. On May 11, 1988, two army units 
staged a coup attempt, which was quickly put down. Defense 
Minister Hector Gramajo had six officers involved arrested and 
three others suspended or retired.64 This may reflect that 
the coup was directed at Gramajo. All of the plotters were 
later granted amnesty.65 The coup plotters reflected 
sentiments of elements within the military unwilling to make 
serious adjustments towards civilian rule. While Gramajo 
still intended to preserve a great deal of military autonomy, 
those on the Right or Far Right saw the possible alliance 
between more moderate sections of the military and Cerezo as 
threatening. Such an alliance would exclude the Far Right.66 
At this point a change seemed to have occurred in Cerezo*s 
relationship with the military. In exchange for protecting 
the civilian government from the plotting officers, Cerezo 
reportedly gave up any authority he had over the military.67 
After this, Cerezo*s influence with the military continued to
^James LeMoyne, "Guatemalan Army Arrests 6 Officers 
Linked to Coup," New York Times, 15 May 1988, in ISLA.
65Hockstader, "Coup Attempt."
^Richard Millett, phone interview by author.
67Freed, "Rights Abuse."
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wane.
Almost a year later on May 9, 1389, another coup attempt
was put down by troops loyal to the government. Again, the
target was likely the moderate Defense Minister. The day of
the coup attempt, Cerezo and Grama jo held a joint news
conference showing the solidarity between the two. Gramajo
pledged support for the President, announcing that the
plotters had been arrested and investigations were
proceeding.68 In addition, Cerezo claimed:
There is complete tranquillity and 
support for the institutional process, as 
is expected from the Guatemalan Army.
That is why we have said that the Army, 
as an institution, has complied with its 
responsibility. Only a few individuals 
who had already been punished for 
irresponsibility or lack of 
professionalism are involved. So there 
is no problem.69
Although Cerezo lost much of his power in the previous 
coup attempt, this second incident further increased his 
dependence on the faction of the military committed to 
civilian rule.70 This reflects Cerezo's accommodation and 
weakness in relation to the military* As an indication of 
Cerezo*s position, some of the demands of rebel officers were 
met by the administration including: increased military
^ FBIS (10 May 1989), 11-12.
69Ibid. , 12.
70Boudreaux, "Revolt in Guatemala."
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spending, more political officers in key public administration 
positions, military control over police forces, continuing 
Civil Defense Patrols, and closing the political opening for 
the URNG.71 As after the first coup attempt, paramilitary 
actions and human rights violations by the army rose.72
Though Cerezo lost influence as a result of the coup
attempts, it is argued that he did not do enough in the
beginning of his term to try to tame the military. This is
the reason for the following allegation:
'Cerezo has had less trouble with the 
military than he should have had, 1 
comments one Western diplomat 
caustically. 'He's done everything but 
put on a uniform, and he has less control 
over the military than he might have had 
because of the way he is dealing with 
them. '73
This accusation, although noting a useful perspective, ignores
the realities of political life in Guatemala. Cerezo
apparently never expected to consolidate democratic rule, and 
so, did not vigorously work towards this goal.74 Perhaps 
viewing his term in office as a transition period was a 
realistic attitude under the circumstances.
71 Barry, 46.
72Paul Kantz, "Guatemala's Reform Effort Is Failing,"
Christian Science Monitor, 23 August 1989, in ISLA.
^Peter Ford, "Guatemala Inches Forward," Christian
Science Monitor, 23 June 1986, in ISLA.
74Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemalan Army Yields Little Power to 
Leader," New York Times, 13 May 1987, in ISLA.
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Merely completing his term can be seen as an 
accomplishment in itself, and any move towards democracy an 
even greater one, considering some views from within the 
military:
* Vinicio is a project of ours —  not 
Vinicio himself, but the return of 
civilian institutions,1 a top Guatemalan 
Army man said recently. 'This civilian 
project is really a military project. We 
can defend the country better this way.
That’s why we were the first to press for 
elections, and that’s why we want this 
project to succeed. '75
Although the military withdrew from political office, this did
not mean that any power was relinquished to civilians along
with government offices. The military remained as it planned
"the power behind the throne.1'76
The position of Guatemala is similar to that of Brazil. 
With unequal civilian accommodation in prerogative areas, the 
military was able to prevail without much contestation. 
Though this identifies the pattern of Guatemala's civil- 
military relations, Guatemala cannot easily be classified as 
either solely democratic or authoritarian. The situation 
during Cerezo's term was somewhat unique in Guatemala's 
history, including both democratic and authoritarian elements.
^Stephen Kinzer, "Walking the Tightrope in Guatemala,"
New York Times, 9 November 1986, in ISLA.
76Lernoux, 556.
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CHAPTER FOUR
This thesis proposed to answer the following question: 
How have civil-military relations determined the nature of 
transition towards democracy in Guatemala from 1986-1990? 
Using Stepan's model, the research reveals that civil-military 
relations discouraged a full transition as defined in this 
thesis. As used here, a transition indicates movement from an 
authoritarian regime to a liberal-democratic one, meaning that 
ruling is based on the consent of society. Instead, the 
situation in Guatemala during the Cerezo administration 
closely resembles what Alfred Stepan describes as unequal 
civilian accommodation, or a "civilian headed garrison 
state."1 The research presented here indicates that while 
military prerogatives were high, open military contestation 
was not necessary due to accommodation on the part of civilian 
officials. Examination of the main areas for potential 
conflict between the military and civilian government in the 
case of Guatemala, led to the conclusion that a situation of 
unequal civilian accommodation existed from 1986-1990.
Many issues faced the military in the period prior to
1Stepan, 101.
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withdrawal from politics: economic decline and an increasing
foreign debt burden illustrated the military's inability to 
manage the economy effectively; violence of the military 
government against citizens isolated Guatemala from 
international financial resources worsening the country's 
economic situation; and internal divisions within the military 
reflected the strains of governing, conflict over return to 
civilian government and methods for pursuing 
counterinsurgency.
The narrative presented in this thesis noted that from 
1954 until 1986, with the exception of one presidential term, 
the military ruled Guatemala directly. The coup in 1954, 
which brought the military to power, aimed its violence at 
progressive or leftist political actors. For the next two 
decades, military attention focused on excluding these 
elements from politics. As a result, guerrilla insurgencies, 
such as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), 
developed in the highland areas* Subsequent military 
governments devoted substantial energy to fighting these 
guerrilla groups, which provided a rationale for continued 
military rule.
In 1982, with the coming to power of General Efrain Rios 
Montt, the military engaged in a campaign to destroy the 
guerrillas. Rios Montt, a fundamentalist Protestant, headed 
a government (1982-1983), which set about permanently altering
83
the organization of the countryside. In the process, 
thousands were killed. Civil Defense Patrols, model villages 
and civic action programs were used to gain control of rural 
areas for the military with some success. This facilitated 
the transfer from military to civilian government in 1986, as 
it placed the military in a position of strength.
General Mejia Victores led a group of officers which 
overthrew Rios Montt in 1983. General Mejia reinforced 
military discipline and prepared for elections in 1985. 
Several factors prompted the military to return to the 
barracks. The military had been unable to halt economic 
decline and faced a tremendous foreign debt burden. Military 
human rights abuses isolated Guatemala internationally, as 
well as dislocating the rural work force and prompting a 
decline in the tourist trade. A constituent assembly drafted 
a constitution and held elections which were won by Vinicio 
Cerezo Arevalo. Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, took office in 
1986. At the time of the transfer, the army's strength in 
relation to other political actors was at its highest point.
Throughout this period, the Guatemalan military searched 
for security and stability. However, continued guerrilla 
insurgency and conflict among factions within the institution, 
exacerbated by the costs of governing, added to political 
instability. Groups within the military saw a return to 
civilian government as a long-term project for stability.
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Civilian government would bring increased amounts of military 
and economic assistance, and allow the military to preserve 
unity. Involvement in politics had caused increased 
factionalism within the military, and returning to the 
barracks meant preserving institutional cohesion. Returning 
to the barracks, however, did not mean surrendering power, as 
the military retained the capacity to influence the political 
system.
At the time of the transition from military to civilian 
government in 1986, the military held a set of established 
prerogatives. A prerogative exists when the military believes 
it has the right to control an issue. Contestation involves 
open articulated conflict with civilian authorities over these 
issues or prerogatives. Prerogative areas in Guatemala at the 
time of military withdrawal included: amnesty for past human
rights violations by the military; the military budget; 
control over military mission and structure, domination of the 
countryside; and pursuit of counterinsurgency campaigns. The 
latter two were aided by United States military assistance, 
which helped the Guatemalan military develop an effective 
internal security capacity. In 1977, the U.S. suspended 
military aid to Guatemala in an effort to promote a transition 
to civilian government, though, in my view, the suspension of 
aid was not the deciding factor in bringing about the 
transition. U.S. pressure was secondary to the internal
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d y n a m i c s  o f  G u a t e m a l a  a n d  t h e  G u a t e m a l a n  m i l i t a r y .
The time the military spent in politics exacerbated 
tensions within the armed forces. Divisions over
opportunities for graft, techniques for pursuing 
counterinsurgency, and the transition itself were important 
concerns. The military found ruling more difficult than it 
had anticipated, and governing distorted military functions. 
Withdrawal to the barracks served in some ways to preserve 
military unity, but with elected civilian government and the 
absence of a significant guerrilla threat, the military was 
forced to reevaluate its central mission.
This thesis has documented that the internal dynamics of 
the military affected civil-military relations from 1986-1990. 
Coup attempts in 1988 and 1989 provided evidence of factional 
tensions within the military and dissatisfaction with civilian 
government. To ward threats from the Right, President Cerezo 
became dependent upon moderate sectors of the military for 
support. This left Cerezo without much basis to challenge
military prerogatives, as evidenced by the lack of
contestation. As Stepan discussed, high levels of military 
prerogatives and low levels of contestation indicate a 
situation of unequal civilian accommodation, or as described 
here, a civilian government unable to challenge strong
military prerogatives.
Open contestation between the military and civilian
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government was rare. Military human rights abuses, for 
example, continued after Cerezo took office. Although Cerezo 
created the office of Human Rights Ombudsman and the Human 
Rights Commission, conditions deteriorated in 1989 and 1990. 
In other words, civilian inquiries into past human rights 
abuses did not prevent continued abuses or declare 
responsibility for previous violations. A clear indication of 
military strength in a prerogative area (no accountability for 
human rights abuses committed by the military) was President 
Cerezo*s declaration that he would not repeal decree 8-86 
which granted amnesty to the military for past human rights 
violations. At the end of Cerezo's term, no military officers 
had been convicted of human rights abuses. In short, 
contestation by the Guatemalan armed forces was minimal owing 
to the Cerezo government's accommodation.
This thesis also noted that under the guidelines of 
Esquipulas II, negotiations between the government and the 
guerrillas were to be held. Meaningful talks with the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) were prevented 
by the military. Instead, continuing counterinsurgency 
efforts led to further abuses by the military. One measure to 
control the countryside, forced participation in Civil Defense 
Patrols, remained problematic, despite the constitution's 
stipulation for voluntary patrols. Indians complained to the 
government of conscripted service. The government, however,
87
took no action. The war on drugs promoted by the U.S. could 
represent a new mission for the armed forces in Guatemala and 
was used as an excuse for continued military dominance in the 
countryside. Because the military defined control of the 
countryside and freedom to continue counterinsurgency 
campaigns as key prerogatives, the Cerezo government did not 
challenge the armed forces in these areas.
As noted in this thesis, contestation was not evident 
over the military budget. As a percentage of government 
expenditures, the military budget declined in relation to the 
years prior to the transition, but leveled out at a percentage 
higher than that of the early 1980s. The decline in actual 
value of military spending reflected the shrinking of the 
government budget as a whole. My argument suggests that the 
decrease reflects constricting government resources rather 
than attempts by the civilian government to reduce the 
military's budget. Thus, access to U.S. military assistance 
became more important to supplement military spending.
The Cerezo government faced two coup attempts which were 
easily put down. They reflected tensions within the armed 
forces and were aimed both at moderate Defense Minister 
Gramajo and Cerezo. The coup attempts represented the 
sentiments of factions of the military left out by a new 
alliance between moderate elements in the military, 
represented by Gramajo, and civilians. Notably, the extreme
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Right was excluded and plotted to retain its own set of 
prerogatives. Defense Minister Gramajo achieved a high level 
of autonomy for the armed forces by negotiating with these 
forces. As a result, Cerezo became dependent on Gramajo and 
his faction of the military for support.
The high levels of prerogatives and low levels of 
contestation indicate that unequal civilian accommodation was 
the pattern of civil-military relations in Guatemala during 
the Cerezo administration. The military continued to play an 
important role in national politics. The civilian government 
had to contend with the veto power of the military over 
policymaking. As a result, the military was able to control 
issues about which it was concerned without holding office. 
Cerezo*s dependence on Gramajo's faction within the armed 
forces further weakened his government's ability to act 
autonomously.
Stepan's model proved useful in a comparative setting. 
The areas for examination were relevant to the Guatemalan 
case, and provided a gauge of civil-military relations during 
the Cerezo administration. Using this model, the prospects 
for democratization appear grim. Even though the model 
devised by Stepan is dynamic, allowing for change, including 
further democratization, this was not the case in Guatemala 
from 1986-1990. Though democratization was not the result of 
the transfer from military to civilian government, a change
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did occur. Perhaps what may better describe the situation is 
a legitimation of military rule through civilian government 
and institutions.
The situation of Guatemala from 1986-1990 is not unique 
and represents broader issues of civil-military relations in 
Latin America. Other Latin American states have had similar 
experiences. With the latest wave of transitions front 
authoritarian rule, democracy has had significant ideological 
value in Latin America, but with limited results. Guillermo 
O'Donnell describes the problem as follows:
it should be pointed out that 
positive evaluation of political 
democracy per se and, especially, the 
fear of relapsing into authoritarian 
rule, may make democratic leaders 
excessively cautious on some crucial 
issues. These include how civilian 
governments select and implement policies 
aimed at alleviating the more pressing 
inequalities of their countries, and how 
they maneuver the armed forces into a 
situation of reasonably effective 
subordination to their authority.
Excessive caution in these domains may 
facilitate the transition to limited 
democracy (democraduras), but for the 
same reason it is likely to generate 
regimes too weak and too devoid of 
popular support to be viable in the 
medium and long run.2
Stepan's classification of unequal civilian accommodation,
2Guillermo O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American 
Cases,” in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin
America, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1986), 11.
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with civilians proceeding in an excessively cautious manner, 
resembles this concept of a limited democracy.
Too often the two extremes, democracy and 
authoritarianism, are discussed without the possibility of a 
combination including elements of both, what might be called 
a "hybrid" or O'Donnell's democradura. That Latin America 
oscillated between cycles of authoritarian rule and democracy 
was held as common wisdom. To better understand the latest 
wave of transitions, more refined typologies are needed to 
describe regimes that are part free and democratic and part 
authoritarian. In some cases, democratic institutions may 
only provide a mask for authoritarian politics. One reason 
for discussing and identifying hybrids is to allow for 
equilibrium or stability of a regime type between the extremes 
of authoritarianism and democracy.3
Edelberto Torres-Rivas discusses hybrids in a slightly 
different terms. He describes the recent changes in Central 
American politics as possible democracy. The possible 
democracy, while still relying on authoritarian elements, 
differs from the despotism of previous years in which popular 
access to participation and power were not imaginable.
3James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin 
America," in Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition
in Latin America, eds. James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. 
Seligson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987),
236, 256-257; and Lucien W. Pye, "Political Science and the 
Crisis of Authoritarianism," American Political Science Review 
84 no. 1 (March 1990): 13.
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Authoritarian elements and the possibility of democracy 
together form the possible democracy. The possible democracy 
in Central America combines persistent authoritarianism with 
a new type of organization of political life. The key in 
forming a possible democracy is the foundation of a democratic 
method of government. That democracy is seen as an attainable 
goal accounts for changes towards possible democracy.4
James M, Malloy addresses the issue of hybrids more 
directly* The process of transition in Latin America in the 
1980s represents movement towards types of hybrid regimes. 
Malloy in essence describes two types or manifestations of 
hybrid regimes. In the first, democracy, in an electoral 
sense, is combined with an authoritarian style of governance. 
According to Malloy, this type of authoritarian decision 
making is prevalent where executives must implement economic 
austerity programs. Policy making in this way does not favor 
the type of bargaining among options associated with a liberal 
democratic system* A second variation of hybrid form would be 
civilian governments fronting authoritarian regimes in which 
the military dominates a civil-military pact.5
4Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Repression and Resistance: The
Struggle for Democracy in Central America (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1989), 143, 150-151.
5James M. Malloy, "Economic Crisis and Democratization: 
Latin America in the 1980s", in Latin American and Caribbean 
Contemporary Record vol. 8, eds. James M. Malloy and Eduardo 
Gamarra (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1991), 149-150.
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James M. Malloy and Eduardo A* Gamarra describe Bolivia 
during the administration of President Victor Paz Estenssoro 
from 1985-1989 as the first type of hybrid identified above.6 
In order to deal with the economic situation and manage 
austerity, Paz Estenssoro resorted to authoritarian decision 
making.7 As a result of a pact between the major political 
parties, decisions made by the executive or a few top 
decision-makers were legitimated by the legislature. Rather 
than functioning as a law making body, the legislature 
legitimated executive decisions. Malloy and Gamarra argue 
that this may evolve into a hybrid regime where the executive 
holds authoritarian decision making power while the 
legislature serves to legitimate the system.8
Guatemala represents the second type of hybrid regime. 
Even though elections were held, the guerrilla insurgency 
weakened and a transfer to civilian government took place, 
Edelberto Torres-Rivas describes the situation in Guatemala as 
one in which the military retained power. The civilian 
government was reduced to public administration, while the 
military made significant decisions. Though the military 
continued to dominate the political system, Torres-Rivas
6James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra, Revolution and 
Reaction (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988), 226.
7Malloy, "Economic Crisis," 149.
8Malloy and Gamarra, 226.
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suggests that this may be the Central American way of 
affecting a transition.9 Torres-Rivas description of 
Guatemala during the Cerezo administration resembles the 
"hybrid" model described by Malloy in which civilians, through 
elections, provide a facade of legitimacy for the military. 
Formal democratic institutions existed, while the military 
exercised authoritarian power.
This second type of hybrid regime may also be seen in 
Peru. Since Alberto Fujimori assumed the Presidency of Peru 
in 1990, he has often ruled by decree, bypassing the 
legislature. In the chaotic context of Peruvian politics, 
with political violence from both the Shining Path and the 
military, Peru can be seen as a democradura. Though the 
formal institutions of democracy exist, the violent climate 
leads to a vital role for the military.10 The situation in 
Peru has been termed Fuj iborizacion11, referring to past 
events in Uruguay.
During the administration of Jose Maria Bordaberry in 
Uruguay, the military accused Senators and deputies of
9Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Centroamerica: La Democracia
Posible (Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1987}, 174.
10Francisco Durand, "Peru; Political Stalemate in the 
Time of Cholera," Paper presented at the Conference 
Democracia, Mercados y Reformas Estructurales en America 
Latina (Buenos Aires: March 25-27, 1992).
11Carlos Monje , Lecture, Florida International 
University, Miami, Florida, February 2, 1992.
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corruption and links to terrorist organizations. As a result, 
the military began to believe that they could promote 
development and prevent subversion better than the President. 
When it became obvious that Bordaberry could not beat the 
military, he joined them. The military had refused his choice 
of Defense Minister and the National Assembly would not revoke 
a Senator's immunity from prosecution for terrorist links. In 
response, Bordaberry closed the National Assembly and headed 
a military dominated regime.12 Thus, the term Fujiborizacion 
is based in the similar problems of ruling in Peru and 
Uruguay.
The situation of a hybrid regime does not represent a 
full transition to democracy, and possibly does not indicate 
that further liberalization is on the way. What the case of 
Guatemala and others may point to is a new equilibrium in the 
political systems of Latin American states, somewhere between 
authoritarianism and democracy. In the Guatemalan case, the 
military affects policy through civilian government. If the 
military refrains from direct intervention into politics, this 
"hybrid" system has the potential to remain stable for some 
time.
The identification of Guatemala as the second type of
12Charles G. Gillespie, "Uruguay's Transition from 
Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule," in Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell,
Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 175-176.
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hybrid discussed in this chapter provides a confirmation of 
the validity of Stepan's model. The hybrid is in essence 
Stepan's unequal civilian accommodation. Both terms refer to 
military dominated regimes with weak civilian authority and 
formal democratic institutions. Thus, Stepan's model was 
useful in identifying the nature of civil-military relations 
in Guatemala during the Cerezo administration.
If the situation changes in the future, Stepan's model 
provides an explanation. The model is not static and explains 
shifts based on differing levels of prerogatives and 
contestation. A shift to a harder line within the military, 
for example, could lead to higher levels or more extensive 
prerogatives. This could make it more difficult for civilian 
government to avoid challenging these prerogatives, leading to 
increased contestation. Such shifts can be discussed using 
Stepan's model, allowing a reassessment of a case over time.
As in Guatemala, other Latin American states may 
experience this type of "hybrid democratization." Though 
these systems may not represent democracy in the traditional 
liberal democratic sense, a type of government, with many 
variations, may be evolving and represent the opportunity for 
stability of regime type. This realization is useful in 
evaluating Latin American transitions, as it provides for a 
more realistic goal upon which to judge progress away from 
authoritarianism.
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